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Article 12

Swedloff: Uncompensated Torts

UNCOMPENSATED TORTS
Rick Swedloff*
Victims of intentional torts suffer more than $460 billion of
damages each year. Unlike those injured by negligence, however,
those injured by intentional acts often have no practical remedy.
They cannot recover from judgment proof defendants, and no other
part of the compensatory system provides a significant remedy. Thus,
victims of the most egregious torts go uncompensated. This failure to
compensate magnifies certain inequities. Victims are likely to be hit
twice by these bad acts: once by the victimization itself and once
because they have few financial resources to aid them on their road
to recovery.
This Article explores the possibility of filling the compensatory
gap. It begins by mapping and considering the structural reasons for
the compensatory gap. It then offers three possible solutions,
including mandating liability insurance for intentional bad acts,
enhancing existing compensation funds, and creating a market so
that individuals can insure against noneconomic losses. Although the
Article ultimately offers a sobering and perhaps pessimistic view of
the possibility that any of these proposals will be enacted, it suggests
that there are significant and important reasons for these
redistributive programs. Creating remedies may express and confirm
our shared societal values about the abhorrence of intentional torts
and the importance of noneconomic damages. Forcing the
government to invest in compensation may encourage it to devote
additional resources to crime prevention. And, to the extent that the
private insurers are part of the solution, those insurers may become
additional, powerful lobbyists on behalf of crime reduction.

*
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earlier and often multiple drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank Kristopher Berr, Kara Borski,
Alexander Rubenstein, and Andrew Russell for their research assistance.

721

Published by Reading Room, 2012

1

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 12

722

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:3

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................723
I. MAPPING THE COSTS....................................................................727
II. THE FAILINGS OF THE COMPENSATORY SYSTEM ........................734
A. The Illusory Promise of Tort ..............................................735
1. Liability Insurance as an Element of Tort ....................736
2. Intentional Torts and Liability Insurance ....................739
3. The Quest for Coverage ...............................................741
B. Gaps in the First Party Insurance Regime ........................744
C. Limitations of the Victims’ Rights Movement ....................749
1. Victim Restitution .........................................................750
2. Victim Compensation Funds ........................................754
III. CREATING REMEDIES (AND THE REMEDIES NOT CREATED)......758
A. Liability Insurance for Intentional Torts ...........................759
1. Outline of the Program.................................................759
(a) Adverse Selection, Null Selection, and
Compulsory Insurance ...........................................761
(b) Controlling the Fear of Moral Hazard .................762
(c) The Moral Mistake ................................................766
2. Tort’s Expressive Function ..........................................767
3) Political Reality............................................................768
B) Enhanced Compensation Funds ........................................771
C) A Market for First Party Insurance ...................................774
1) Supplying Insurance for Noneconomic Injuries...........775
2) Creating Demand for Noneconomic Loss Insurance ...777
3) Benefits and the Need for Subsidization ......................783
CONCLUSION ....................................................................................786

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss3/12

2

Swedloff: Uncompensated Torts

2012]

UNCOMPENSATED TORTS

723

INTRODUCTION
Tort law serves to regulate antisocial conduct and to provide
compensation for those who have been injured by others.1 One might
think that in light of these goals, the more egregious the conduct, the
more necessary the regulatory function and the more deserving the
compensation. Intentional torts like assault and battery would thus
take primacy over negligence in the pantheon of tort, because the
tortfeasor deliberately—rather than negligently—injured an innocent
victim. But tort law on the ground fails most victims of intentional
tort. It creates no deterrence and provides no compensation.
Imagine the following: Three brothers walk by your doorstep on a
winter evening. The first gets struck by lightning. The second slips
and falls on a patch of ice that you negligently failed to clear from
your walk. The third you hit with a shovel. All three are seriously
injured; perhaps each is paralyzed or suffers severe brain injuries.
Each requires medical attention, loses wages and earning potential,
and endures significant pain and suffering. To say that the brothers
have each lost some enjoyment of life would be an understatement.
These three brothers, however, are not similarly situated with respect
to their potential remedies, because they have been injured in vastly
different ways.
It is relatively easy to see that the first brother cannot obtain a
remedy through tort. Tort requires fault. The first brother cannot sue
you, because you have done nothing wrong. You did not cause the
lightning strike. It is bad luck, a misfortune, an act of god. The
brother cannot sue the universe. Who would stand in defense or pay
the judgment? Likewise, if this brother was injured in a single car
accident, he couldn’t sue himself; and if he cut his left hand while
1. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 525 (2003)
(stating that from a practical standpoint, “the ad hoc legislation undertaken within tort cases is inherently
capable of promoting only two goals: deterrence of antisocial conduct and compensation for those who
have been injured.”). As Goldberg notes, this functional account is the underpinning of the Restatement
approach to tort law and the law applied in many courtrooms. Id. It has, of course, yielded theoretical
ground. The two most visible opposition theories are brought from the perspective of law and economics
and corrective justice. See id.; MARTHA CHAMALLAS & JENNIFER WRIGGINS, THE MEASURE OF INJURY:
RACE, GENDER, AND TORT LAW 14–16 (2010).
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slicing bagels, his left hand could not sue his right. Someone else
must be at fault to justify a remedy in tort. And the first brother’s
accident is certainly not your fault.2
But what may be surprising is that the third brother is also without
a remedy in tort. While tort provides the appropriate causes of
action—assault and battery—it is unlikely to provide a real
mechanism for obtaining a remedy. Certainly the third brother could
sue.3 Assuming he could prove that you were unjustified in the
attack, he would likely win. But how much could he recover? What
assets do you have to satisfy the judgment? Like most people, you
likely do not have sufficient assets to pay significant judgments. And
the one asset usually available to fill this void—liability insurance,
insurance that you purchase to cover your responsibility for harms
you inflict on others—will not, and likely cannot, cover intentional
acts.
Tort serves only the middle brother. The first brother has no cause
of action, and thus no remedy. He simply hasn’t suffered a tort. The
third brother has a cause of action, but no remedy. He can’t squeeze
money from a judgment-proof tortfeasor after the fact. Assuming he
can prove negligence, the second brother has both a cause of action
and a likely source of recovery. This compensatory gap is at the core
of this paper. Why doesn’t tort provide a remedy for the third
brother? Why aren’t those who are harmed intentionally equally
deserving of compensation as those harmed by negligence? Why
aren’t those who act intentionally subject to tort law’s deterrent
function? What can be done to fill this gap? And why hasn’t some
other part of our compensatory system stepped in to provide
compensation to those who have been injured by the intentional acts
of others?

2. Admittedly, there are those who critique tort on a distributive basis and believe that there should
be compensation for acts of God. See, e.g., Ronen Avraham & Issa Kohler-Hausmann, Accident Law for
Egalitarians, 12 LEGAL THEORY 181, 186 (2006) (“[A]ny scheme of accident law must . . . assure . . .
compensation for victims who suffer comparable losses to bodily integrity, regardless of the source of
that loss.”). That debate, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
3. While he can sue, he may find it difficult to find a lawyer willing to bring the case. See infra Part
II.A.1 for a complete discussion of this point.
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The losses suffered by victims of intentional torts are significant.
One way to think about the scope of these losses is to consider the
civil cost of crime. Torts such as battery, assault, false imprisonment,
and conversion stand at the boundary between criminal and civil law.
These civil counterparts to criminal law provide causes of action for
victims of physical violence, abuse, intimidating and threatening
behavior, and theft. Thus, crime statistics can serve as a useful proxy
for mapping intentional torts. According to an influential study
commissioned by the Department of Justice, crime creates more than
$460 billion in private and social costs each year.4 Over three
quarters of this amount, some $355 billion, is attributable to
noneconomic losses like pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of
life.5 Rape victims who can’t sleep at night, gunshot victims who are
permanently handicapped, assault victims with chronic back pain,
and burglary victims who feel unsafe in their homes have all suffered
noneconomic damages.6 In total, the losses attributable to crime are
more than the gross domestic product of every state except
California, Texas, New York, Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania, New
Jersey, and Ohio.7 The losses are more than the GDP of every
country except the largest thirty nation states, more than the GDP of
Pakistan, Belgium, Nigeria, Sweden, or Hong Kong.8 Were the
noneconomic portion alone translated into gross domestic product,
4. See MARK A. COHEN, THE COSTS OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 46–47 (2005). Cohen’s 2005 estimate
is in 2003 dollars, and is based on 2002 victimization rates. It is an update of an earlier study by Ted R.
Miller, Mark A. Cohen, and Brian Wiersema. See TED R. MILLER ET AL., U. S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, VICTIM COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES: A NEW LOOK 1 (1996), available at
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/victcost.pdf.
5. COHEN, supra note 4, at 47. Cohen attributes approximately $105 billion of the cost of criminal
victimization to “tangible” costs and the remainder—$355 billion—to “intangible losses such as pain,
suffering, and lost quality of life.” Id.
6. The ALI divides noneconomic tort into four broad categories: (1) tangible physiological pain at
the time of the injury and during recuperation, (2) mental anguish and suffering felt both before and
after a physical injury, (3) emotional distress and long-term loss of love and companionship from the
injury or death of a close family member, and (4) loss of enjoyment of life by victim of a tort. See 2 AM.
LAW INST., REPORTER’S STUDY, ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY 199–200 (1991).
7. See GEORGE K. DOWNEY & GERARD P. AMAN, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF ECON.
ANALYSIS, GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT BY STATE ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY (2006), available at
http://www.bea.gov/regional/pdf/gsp/GDPState.pdf.
8. See Cent. Intelligence Agency, Country Comparison: GDP (Purchasing Power Parity), THE
WORLD
FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-worldfactbook/rankorder/2001rank.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2011).
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the losses would be the fifteenth most prosperous state in this country
and the thirty-fifth biggest economy in the world.
There are well-documented criticisms about tort law as a
mechanism for compensation.9 One could almost certainly design a
more efficient and equitable system.10 But even if tort is flawed as a
mechanism of recovery, one could reasonably believe that losses of
this scale would not be systematically ignored by the tort system. A
compensatory gap of this magnitude presents a profound challenge to
the purpose of tort. It suggests that tort law is neither serving the
deterrence nor the compensation function.
The government may pick up some of the deterrence slack through
criminal enforcement, but it has not created a significant mechanism
for compensation, leaving millions without remedy. Nor has any
other part of the compensatory system rushed in to fill this void.
Again, given the size of the loss, one might think that insurance
companies could (profitably) find a way to distribute the risk of these
harms. Or, one might think that the government would step in to help
compensate victims of crime. This simply hasn’t happened.
Individuals typically cannot purchase first party insurance to cover
their own noneconomic losses.11 And, while the government provides
some compensation through criminal victim restitution and victim
compensation funds, these programs are inadequate (as presently
constructed) to provide complete remedies.
This Article considers the structural barriers to creating the
remedies for these uncompensated torts. Other articles have noted
that tort law fails to compensate victims of intentional torts.12 This
9. See, e.g., Ellen S. Pryor, Part of the Whole: Tort Law’s Compensatory Failures Through a Wider
Lens, 27 REV. LITIG. 307, 307 (2008) (collecting sources).
10. Economists express concerns about the amount of money provided through tort and the costs of
the tort system. And from a corrective justice standpoint, there are concerns that tort neither provides
similarly situated victims similar compensation nor provides those with more severe injuries more
money. See id. at 309 (providing a brief overview of the literature).
11. This is true whether the injury is caused by an act of God, through someone else’s negligence, or
as a result of an intentional act.
12. See, e.g., Tom Baker, Liability Insurance at the Tort-Crime Boundary, in FAULT LINES: TORT
LAW AS CULTURAL PRACTICE 66 (David M. Engle & Michael W. McCann eds., 2009); Hazel Glenn
Beh, Tort Liability For Intentional Acts of Family Members: Will Your Insurer Stand By You?, 68
TENN. L. REV. 1 (2000); Donald F. Farbstein & Francis J. Stillman, Insurance for the Commission of
Intentional Torts, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1219 (1969); James M. Fischer, The Exclusion From Insurance
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Article, however, considers not just the failure of tort, but also the
failure of the entire compensatory system to create remedies for
victims of intentional bad acts. It then considers three ways the
government might subsidize insurance regimes to create
compensation. The Article ultimately takes a somewhat pessimistic
view of the possibility of creating a more complete compensation
regime. Nonetheless, it includes a plea to take this gap seriously.
Intentional torts magnify the inequities of society. Victims of
intentional torts are disproportionately poor and young. These groups
are likely hit twice by crime: once by the victimization itself and
once because they have few financial resources to aid them on their
road to recovery.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I addresses the scope of the
problem by looking at the kinds and amount of losses victims suffer
each year. Part II draws on conventional economic theory and
behavioral insights into litigation and insurance decisions to explain
why the current compensation system, including tort and social and
private insurance, fails victims. Part III concludes with a grim
perspective on three possible solutions to creating compensation for
these uncompensated torts. While each of the solutions proposed
could provide real remedies or risk spreading opportunities for
victims, there are significant barriers for each.
I. MAPPING THE COSTS
What if a crime victim could identify his criminal and haul him
before the bar of civil justice? This isn’t a particularly far-fetched
hypothetical—most crimes, after all, are also intentional torts,
compensable through civil law. Of course, as will be discussed
below, this is only hypothetical, because victims cannot recover from
(mostly) judgment proof criminals. But, assuming criminals could
pay, how much could victims hope to recover?
Coverage of Losses Caused by the Intentional Acts of the Insured: A Policy In Search of a Justification,
30 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95 (1990); Jennifer Wriggins, Domestic Violence Torts, 75 S. CAL. L. REV.
121 (2001).
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As with any negligence or strict liability tort, the victim could
hope to recover obvious financial losses associated with the crime,
including the losses from property theft or damage, lost wages and
loss of earning potential, and the costs of medical care. These losses
are typically thought of as a victim’s economic losses.13 Likewise, a
victim could hope to recover his noneconomic losses—those losses
that are difficult to count or itemize—like pain, suffering, or loss of
enjoyment of life. In the context of criminal victimization, these
noneconomic losses might also include avoidance behaviors such as
moving to a new neighborhood, changing travel patterns, or refusing
to walk outside at night.14 Taken together, the economic and
noneconomic losses represent the damages victims could hope to
recover in tort.
Not all scholars, however, count all of these costs as costs of
crime. For example, some scholars would not count losses from
stolen property as economic losses, because society has not lost out
on the value of the property.15 The theft merely represents a transfer
of wealth from victim to thief. To these scholars, a loss would only
accrue if, for example, the property were destroyed during
commission of a crime, because no one could take advantage of the
value of the property.16 This is likely counter-intuitive to most crime
victims who acutely feel the injury from the theft and want
compensation for the cost of replacing the stolen car regardless of
whether someone else is enjoying the use of the car. Other scholars
would not include noneconomic damages as a cost of crime, because
they are intangible, difficult to calculate, and generally disfavored
and mistrusted.17 These concerns, however, do not make victims’
pain or suffering disappear, minimize their fear and anxiety, or
13. See COHEN, supra note 4, at 9; MILLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 1.
14. COHEN, supra note 4, at 9.
15. Id. at 22–23.
16. See id. at 23. Cohen differentiates between “social costs”—those that “reduce the aggregate wellbeing of society”—and “external costs”—those that “are imposed by one person on another, where the
latter person does not voluntarily accept this negative consequence.” Id. Cohen claims that all external
costs should be counted, regardless of whether economists would count the loss as a social cost. Id. at
25.
17. See id. at 23.
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eradicate the loss of enjoyment of life felt by victims of crime. That
said, this is not the time for a full debate about the propriety of these
awards. At bottom, this paper takes account of the value of thefts and
noneconomic damages, as well as economic damages because these
categories of loss would be compensable through the civil system
(were it truly available to victims of crime).18 Just as plaintiffs could
recover for medical bills or lost wages, so too could they sue for the
value of stolen property and for their noneconomic damages. In fact,
it is necessary to count these losses to make a crime victim whole.
Not all of the costs of crime are included, however. Just as there is
an end to the zone of responsibility in tort, beyond which a tortfeasor
is not responsible for the costs created (whether because the people
harmed are outside the zone of danger or are unprotected bystanders),
so too must there be an end to the accounting of the costs of crime in
this Article. Consistent with the civil remedy perspective above, the
Article limits costs at the boundary of potential tort recovery for the
victims of the crime. Other social costs are not included.19
This Article relies heavily on a highly influential study
commissioned by the Department of Justice in 1996 to determine
these costs.20 That study by Ted Miller, Mark Cohen, and Brian
Wiersema—and updated in 2005 by Cohen—is the most
comprehensive analysis of the civil costs of crime to date and is
18. There are other good reasons for counting these intangible costs and the lost property. For
example, society has an interest in preventing these involuntary transfers (thefts) and the pain, suffering,
and lost enjoyment of life. Thus, if a given policy is subject to a cost-benefit analysis, these costs must
be considered. See id. at 24.
19. Of course, many people suffer as a result of criminal activity. Friends and family of the victim
can suffer from loss of the victim’s companionship and services (e.g., housework, bill paying) or be
directly traumatized if they witness the victimization. See COHEN, supra note 4, at 75. Even those who
do not know the victim suffer both directly and indirectly from criminal activity. For example, increased
crime may induce additional expenditures in the criminal justice system through increases in manpower
for police or prosecution and increased costs for courts and prisons. These costs are borne generally
through additional tax payments or through opportunity costs from the taxes already paid. Further, even
if a victim has most of his medical costs covered through insurance, society pays through increased
premiums. Additionally, like victims, other members of society can suffer indirect avoidance costs
because of a fear of crime, and whole neighborhoods might suffer indirect economic costs if consumers
choose to stay away from local restaurants or stores because of a fear of crime. See id. at 9–13, 26. The
article does not include estimates of increased costs to the criminal justice system, increased insurance
payments, or avoidance behaviors by individuals (other than the victim) or society generally.
20. MILLER ET AL., supra note 4.
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especially useful given the methodologies used to calculate crime.21
According to these sources, victims of crime suffer a total of $460
billion worth of damages each year.22 Of that, less than a quarter is
attributable to tangible, economic losses; the remainder is attributable
to noneconomic losses.23 What follows is a more in depth breakdown
of this $460 billion number. I first look at the amount of injury
caused per victimization by type of crime. This gives a sense of the
amount of injury caused by each case of murder, rape, child abuse,
21. Id.; COHEN, supra note 4. This study aggregates a number of different methodologies to
calculate the costs of crime. For fatal injuries, the researchers based their estimates on conventional
willingness to pay estimates. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 14. The researchers “assessed the
market for safety by examining the increased demand for smoke detectors as prices dropped, the
demand for safer cars, and the differential in worker pay due to different levels of risk exposure.” Id.
Although there is some debate about the propriety of these methods for estimating the value of a
statistical life for fatal injuries and the value of noneconomic damages for nonfatal injuries, these are
reasonably conventional methodologies and are quite useful to the project here. Statistical life values are
commonly used in policy discussions and in civil trials. And, if anything, the estimates used by these
researchers are conservative. For example, they used an estimate of $2.7 million for a 38-year-old male.
COHEN, supra note 4, at 60. “[M]ore recent estimates place the statistical value of a life for the average
worker in the U.S. between $3 and $9 million.” Id. (citing Kip Viscusi, The Value of life in Legal
Contexts: Survey and Critique, 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 195 (2000)).
For nonfatal injuries, the researchers took a more directly applicable approach for this Article.
They used settlements and jury awards from the relatively small universe of cases victims who were
able to sue a third party for derivative liability to estimate the noneconomic portion of nonfatal injuries.
See MILLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 15. Recognizing that:
Since cases brought to trial are not necessarily representative of crime cases, the
researchers [did] not apply the pain and suffering estimates directly. Instead, they
estimated the functional relationship between the out-of-pocket costs of crime . . . ;
[demographic] characteristics of the victim . . . ; severity of injury; and the jury’s award
for pain and suffering.
Id. The researchers then took this “functional relationship,” and applied it to actual distribution of crime
victims. Id.
Lest one think that these third party suits are the key to the compensation gap, consider that the
Department of Justice estimated that in 2008, after years of declining crime rates, United States
residents still experienced 4.1 million assaults and over 200,000 rapes or sexual assaults. See MICHAEL
R. RAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2008, at 1
(2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv08.pdf. In total, the Department of Justice
estimated that United States residents experienced 4.9 million violent crimes (including rape, sexual
assault, robbery, and both aggravated and simple assault) and 16.3 million property crimes (including
personal theft, household burglary, theft, and motor vehicle theft). Id. After surveying the entire United
States, the researchers only got data from jury awards and settlements in 1,106 assault survivor cases,
361 rape survivor cases, and 606 burn survivor cases. See MILLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 15. These
numbers are quite small compared to the estimated total number of victimizations. See also infra notes
58–70 and accompanying text for a discussion of derivative liability for intentional torts.
22. COHEN, supra note 4, at 46.
23. See COHEN, supra note 4, at 44; MILLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 9 tbl.2. These estimates, as well
as the ones that follow, are in 1993 dollars and are based on the 1996 study by Miller, Cohen, and
Wiersema.
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robbery, and other crimes. (Figures 1 and 2). I then show some
estimates for the aggregate amount of loss by each category of crime
(Figure 3). This graph shows that given the number of victimizations
each year, certain categories of crime are more costly (e.g., nonfatal
rape and sexual assault) than others (e.g., arson deaths).
On a per victimization level, fatal crimes create the most
significant losses. This, of course, should not be surprising. Miller,
Cohen, and Wiersema estimate that on average, each fatal crime
creates between $2.7 and $3.2 million of losses.24 Over two-thirds of
those losses (nearly $2 million per fatal injury) is attributable to
noneconomic damages.25 Nonfatal crimes have somewhat lesser
impact per victimization. For example, the researchers estimate that
each victim of child abuse suffers $60,000 of damages.26 If the child
abuse includes sexual abuse, each child suffers close to $100,000 of
harm.27 Each adult victim of rape or sexual assault suffers
approximately $87,000 of damages.28 And each victim of arson
suffers approximately $38,000 of damages.29 It is easy to see that
noneconomic damages vastly outweigh the economic losses for most
categories of fatal and nonfatal crime. Figures 1 and 2 summarize this
information.

24. COHEN, supra note 4, at 42–43 tbl.3.1 (citing MILLER ET AL., supra note 4).
25. It is, of course, quite strange to consider the pain and suffering of someone who is dead. Instead
it is easier to think of these awards as an insured’s willingness to pay to avoid the risk of death. See
COHEN, supra note 4, at 36.
26. Id. at 42–43 tbl.3.1.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
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Figure 1: Cost Per Fatal Victimization
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Figure 2: Cost Per Nonfatal Victimization
$100,000

Economic

Noneconomic

$90,000
$80,000
$70,000
$60,000
$50,000
$40,000
$30,000
$20,000
$10,000
$0
Nonfatal Rape
and Sexual
Assault (adult)

Child Abuse

Assault or
Attempt

Robbery or
Attempt

Nonfatal Drunk
Driving

On a per category basis, the graphs look a bit different. This
information is useful if one were to think about targeting
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governmental responses to eliminating categories of crime. For
example, each year more people are victimized by rape and sexual
assault than are killed through arson. Thus, rape and sexual assault
have a greater impact on society than arson. Each year, rape and
sexual assault create losses of approximately $127 billion ($119
billion of which are noneconomic losses); fatal crimes and other
assaults each create approximately $93 billion of harm ($60 and $77
billion of noneconomic harm respectively); followed by child abuse
at $56 billion ($48 billion of noneconomic losses) and drunk driving
at $41 billion ($27 billion of noneconomic losses).30 Figure 3 shows
the breakdown of those costs:
Figure 3: Aggregate Annual Cost of Victimization (millions of
dollars)
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In sum, victims of crime suffer significant damages. Were these
damages monetized in tort lawsuits, they would total approximately
$460 billion and provide compensation for over 21 million
victimizations each year.31 The tort system, however, cannot provide
30. See COHEN, supra note 4, at 45–46 tbl.3.3; MILLER ET AL., supra note 4, at 17 tbl.5.
31. MICHAEL R. RAND, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION, 2008, at 1 (2009), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv08.pdf. This
survey is “an annual data collection conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau for the Bureau of Justice
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remedies for most of those injured by crime, because most criminals
do not have assets sufficient to cover even small tort judgments. I
return to this problem in Section II.
II. THE FAILINGS OF THE COMPENSATORY SYSTEM
In the last part I discussed the cost of the injuries suffered by the
victims of intentional tort each year. In this part, I discuss why the
compensatory system32—including tort, public insurance (like
Medicaid and Medicare), and private insurance—fails to create the
compensation needed. While the compensatory system may help
those injured by negligence or product liability, it often fails to cover
those injured by someone else’s intentional acts.
This section explores the three primary ways U.S. residents could
obtain compensation for, and distribute the risk of harm from,
intentional torts: tort lawsuits; first party insurance—insurance an
individual (the first party) purchases from the insurer (the second
party) to cover his own losses; and government sponsored
compensation programs for victims of crime—victim compensation
funds and victim restitution. With some changes, each of these
sources could provide compensation for victims of intentional torts,
but at present none of these sources alone or in combination provides
real, complete remedies.

Statistics.” Id. at 7. The NCVS is a national survey that asks questions about the number of
victimizations in a year of a representative, random sample of persons age 12 or older in the United
States. Id. Significantly, these estimates exclude two important categories of crime: crimes against
children under 12 and fatal crimes. Nonetheless, because the survey includes data about both reported
and unreported crimes, it is often seen as the most reliable information available about criminal
victimization.
32. The term “compensatory system” is borrowed from Ellen Pryor and is meant to include a number
of potentially overlapping regimes that often provide some means of recovery to those who have been
injured. Ellen S. Pryor, Part of the Whole, Tort Law’s Compensatory Failures Through a Wider Lens,
27 REV. LITIG. 307, 309 (2008). As Pryor notes, “[t]he injuries that give rise to tort cases usually
implicate not just tort law but other strands of our society’s compensatory fabric—Medicare and
Medicaid, Social Security disability, workers’ compensation, private medical insurance, and private
disability insurance.” Id.
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A. The Illusory Promise of Tort
No one expects that tort can create compensation for all injuries.
Of course, many losses simply lie where they fall. But tort is a
significant part of the compensation system33 and is supposed to
provide remedies where one person causes significant injuries to
another. Given the amount of damages caused by intentional acts
both on the individual and aggregate level, one would think that tort
would be responsive to these acts. But there are a number of reasons
why tort law fails victims of intentional torts. First, and not
surprisingly, many criminal offenders are never identified or
apprehended; and thus cannot be brought before a criminal (let alone
a civil) court.34 But even if intentional tortfeasors are identified,
caught, and brought before the civil bar, the tort system would likely
still fail the victims.
This failure can be explained by one thing: liability insurance.
Liability insurance (or third party insurance) is insurance that you
purchase to cover your responsibility for harms you inflict on others.
Although liability insurance can cover negligent acts, it will not, and
likely cannot, cover intentional (that is, criminal) acts. This part first
discusses why liability insurance matters in tort suits; then discusses
why liability insurers will not, and cannot, cover intentional acts; it
concludes with a discussion of the ways the tort system has tried to
adapt to the lack of insurance coverage, and yet likely still fails most
victims of crime.

33. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Twenty-First Century Insurance and Loss Distribution in Tort Law, in
EXPLORING TORT LAW 81, 90–91 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005) (estimating (a) that the compensation
system costs approximately $1.7 trillion annually and that approximately 10% ($175 billion) of those
costs are the result of the tort system; and (b) that the compensation system provides benefits (rather
than costs) in the amount of $1.1 trillion annually, of which about $80 billion or 7% is paid to tort
victims); Pryor, supra note 32, at 311–12 (estimating that on an annual basis tort pays out $80 billion,
workers compensation pays $55.3 billion, Social Security Disability pays $85.4 billion, Medicare pays
$48.8 billion, Medicaid pays $66.7 billion, and other social insurance programs pay somewhere close to
$3 billion annually).
34. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
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1. Liability Insurance as an Element of Tort
Even if criminals are identified and caught, there is a simple reason
that few victims ever proceed in civil court. Most criminals are too
poor to satisfy tort judgments.35 But this explanation is overinclusive. After all, few tortfeasors (whether negligent or intentional
actors) have sufficient, available assets to satisfy a significant tort
judgment.36 For example, a combination of state and federal law
protects over 75% of income from garnishment.37 Likewise, state
laws and the high transaction costs associated with attaching and
selling real and personal property often shield from attack a judgment
debtor’s home equity, automobiles, and interest bearing accounts.38
To the extent that the defendant has any personal wealth, she may
protect it through trusts and other investment vehicles.39 Thus, most
tortfeasors are effectively judgment proof; but there are still suits
against individuals sounding in negligence. The difference between a
35. See infra note 100.
36. See Stephen G. Gilles, The Judgment-Proof Society, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 603, 606 (2006)
(“[M]any Americans are ‘judgment proof’: They lack the sufficient assets (or sufficient collectible
assets) to pay a judgment in full (or even in substantial part).”).
37. Federal law protects a significant portion of any judgment debtor’s wages from garnishment. See
Gilles, supra note 36, at 625. Under the Consumer Credit Protection Act, garnishment may not exceed
the lesser of 25% of an individual’s disposable weekly income or earnings in excess of thirty times the
federal minimum hourly wage. See id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1673(a) (2000)). Some states impose a higher
minimum threshold for garnishment, effectively shielding more of an individual’s income from
attachment. See id. at 626. At a minimum, federal law Social Security, disability, and health insurance
transfers may not be used to satisfy most judgments, including tort judgments. See id. at 624 (citing 42
U.S.C. § 407(a) (2000) (“[N]one of the moneys paid or payable or rights existing under this subchapter
shall be subject to execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process, or to the operation of
any bankruptcy or insolvency law.”)). In addition, “many states exempt state welfare payments,
unemployment compensation, disability benefits, and workers’ compensation from collection.” Id. at
624. As Gilles appropriately notes, “the effect of these federal and state provisions is that garnishment
offers the successful tort claimant only a stream of relatively small payments in most instances.” Id. at
626. This small stream is unlikely to entice most lawyers to garnish wages.
38. All states have some form of protection for personal property. See Richard M. Hynes, et al., The
Political Economy of Property Exemption Laws, 47 J.L. & ECON. 19, 23–24 (2004). Additionally, as
Gilles details, there are significant barriers to collecting on nonexempt home equity and other personal
property, including the inefficiencies of foreclosure, the relatively small amount of equity in homes, the
ability of homeowners to protect themselves by further reducing their equity post suit via home equity
loans, and the high transaction costs of writs of execution on personal property. See Gilles, supra note
36, at 632–34.
39. Even to the extent that the wrongdoer is relatively wealthy and has significant income and wealth
beyond the protections detailed above, the wealthy can protect significant assets in trusts. Gilles, supra
note 36, at 635–41.
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suit for negligence and one for intentional tort is access to liability
insurance. Negligent acts are covered by liability insurance;
intentional acts are not.
Liability insurance is typically the easiest and most available asset
to satisfy a judgment. Access to insurance proceeds impacts the value
of the underlying claim, and ultimately the ability to bring the claim.
According to the standard economic account of litigation behavior,
potential plaintiffs decide whether to bring suit based on the expected
valuation of a claim.40 Plaintiffs bring suit when they expect to win
(financially or otherwise) more than it will cost to bring suit.41
Likewise, contingency attorneys, who often represent plaintiffs in
personal injury suits, must decide whether to take a claim based on
subjective valuations of whether a claim will be profitable.
Profitability of a claim depends on both the expected monetary value
of the claim and what it will cost to obtain that claim. A claim that is
likely to go to trial is only profitable if the expected value of the
claim is high; whereas claims that are likely to settle quickly may be
profitable even with a low expected value. Liability insurance affects
both the expected value of the claim and the amount it will cost to
obtain the recovery.
In theory, lawyers and parties value the claim in the shadow of the
law.42 That is, participants in litigation are supposed to predict what
40. The standard account, sometimes called the Landes-Posner-Gould model, was developed in the
early 1970’s. See John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 (1973);
William Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971); Richard A. Posner,
An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973).
41. In addition to financial compensation, a plaintiff could sue for any number of noneconomic
reasons—to exact punishment, to feel vindicated, to give voice to her injuries, to obtain injunctive relief,
or to otherwise enforce property rules. Plaintiffs cannot reasonably be expected to predict all of the
benefits and costs of litigation, especially the nonmonetary components of litigation. See generally Rick
Swedloff, Accounting for Happiness in Civil Settlements, 108 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 39 (2008),
http://www.columbialawreview.org/assets/sidebar/volume/108/39_Swedloff.pdf. Nor can they be
expected to predict properly the probability of winning or losing a lawsuit at the outset of suit.
Nonetheless, this model provides a helpful way to think about decision-making in the litigation process
and highlights that it is not free to process a tort claim.
42. See generally Robert Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979). As Mnookin and Kornhauser noted in the context of
divorce:
Divorcing parents do not bargain over the division of family wealth and custodial
prerogatives in a vacuum; they bargain in the shadow of the law. The legal rules
governing alimony, child support, marital property, and custody give each parent certain
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they will win at trial to determine what their claims are worth. But
lawyers on the ground can’t limit themselves to the expected value of
a trial judgment. They have to think about the expected value that
they can collect after obtaining a judgment. As one tort lawyer
succinctly reported: “I was taught on my first day of practice there
are three things: liability, damages, collectability. I need
collectability first. I need damages second. I’m a good lawyer, I’ll
prove liability.”43 In other words, the law’s shadow is irrelevant to
settlement negotiations and decisions to litigate if a defendant has no
assets.
This is where liability insurance comes into play. Liability
insurance, to the extent it covers the tortious act, reduces the risk of
an empty judgment. It provides cash, certainty and a reduced time
horizon for payment.44 Lawyers and plaintiffs alike are unlikely to
want to wait for their fees to be paid through garnishment, wade into
the murky waters of collection actions, or risk time and money on
uncertain rewards.45 Garnishment and collection lower the
probability of recovery and the delays decrease the value of the
recovery, because plaintiffs and attorneys have to wait for
disbursements.46
claims based on what each would get if the case went to trial. In other words, the
outcome that the law will impose if no agreement is reached gives each parent certain
bargaining chips—an endowment of sorts.
Id.
43. Tom Baker, The View of an American Insurance Law Scholar: Six Ways That Liability Insurance
Shapes Tort Law, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 4 (2005).
44. See id. at 4–5 (“Given the extent of consumer debt, the availability of bankruptcy to discharge
civil liabilities, and the existence of limited but important exceptions to the assets that must be
liquidated in a bankruptcy proceeding, the practical reality of tort litigation in the United States is that
liability insurance is the only asset that plaintiffs can count on collecting.”).
45. A judgment is not self-executing. It is little more than a declaration that a plaintiff is entitled to
payment. If a defendant refuses to pay, the plaintiff must take significant additional steps to recover on
his judgment. This can be risky, time-consuming, and costly (in terms of cash outlays and opportunity
cost). See Gilles, supra note 36, at 617 (citing MICHAEL J. HERBERT, UNDERSTANDING BANKRUPTCY 30
(2000)).
46. Access to liability insurance may have another role to play in reducing costs involved in a claim.
Insurance companies are repeat players in settlement negotiations, and they have incentives—beyond
those of normal litigants—to settle claims quickly and without trial. See Nora Freeman Engstrom, Runof-the-Mill Justice, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1485, 1542–45 (2010). For many claims, insurers may
want to settle quickly, because of reputational and public relations interests, express and implied
contractual duties, and common law duties to settle. Id. Additionally, insurance companies are likely to
prefer claims to settle quickly and predictably so that they can create fiscal predictability. But see JAY
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Despite this, Tom Baker has found that in cases of intentional
conduct, drunk driving, or where serious injury or death is at issue,
lawyers are often tempted to seek noninsurance assets from
tortfeasors.47 They call these assets “blood money.” It is “real
money” from “real people”—”money paid directly to plaintiffs by
defendants out of their own pockets.”48 And yet, despite the fact that
attorneys may seek blood money in these cases, they rarely collect
anything but insurance proceeds (assuming they can characterize the
conduct in such a way as to fall within the policy limits).49
In sum, liability insurance is often the biggest asset a putative
tortfeasor owns and/or the easiest to collect post judgment. When
tortfeasors lack such insurance or the insurance will not cover the
tortious act, the predicted profitability and expected value of a suit go
down. This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for lawyers and
victims to bring suit and seek financial (or other) remedies through
litigation.
2. Intentional Torts and Liability Insurance
As discussed above, liability insurance appears to be a necessary
precondition to tort suits. But liability insurance will not or cannot
cover intentional acts. First, most liability insurers explicitly write
intentional acts out of coverage by (a) limiting the definition of
covered acts to those that are “neither expected nor intended from the
standpoint of the insured”50 and (b) specifically excluding injuries or
losses “expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured.”51
Second, even if insurers wanted to cover damages flowing from
the intentional acts of their insureds, public policy may preclude
FEINMAN, DELAY, DENY, DEFEND: WHY INSURANCE COMPANIES DON’T PAY CLAIMS AND WHAT YOU
CAN DO ABOUT IT (2010) (arguing that insurers employ a number of techniques to avoid settling or
paying, including lengthening the litigation process and otherwise making it more expensive to bring
claims).
47. Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in Action, 35 LAW
& SOC’Y REV. 275 (2001).
48. See id. at 276, 298–301.
49. Id. at 300–01. See also infra Parts II.A.2–3 for a more complete discussion of these issues.
50. See Fischer, supra note 12, at 105.
51. ROBERT H. JERRY, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 63A, at 384 (2d ed. 1996).
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coverage. As noted by one leading treatise, “[i]t is a fundamental
requirement in insurance law that the insurer will not pay for a loss
unless the loss is ‘fortuitous,’ meaning that the loss must be
accidental in some sense.” 52 Courts may hold that liability insurance
cannot cover the intentional acts of an insured, because human
volition takes these acts out of the realm of fortuity and accident. In
other words, courts may imply an exclusion in insurance policies for
acts that are not fortuitous or accidental from the standpoint of the
insured.53
Given the long-standing policy of insurers to write intentionality
out of coverage explicitly, there is little current law on whether courts
would bar coverage as part of an implicit, public policy ban.54 That
is, courts have not had to consider a question of whether public
policy would allow coverage for intentional bad acts, because
insurers exclude those acts explicitly from coverage. Nonetheless,
courts have expressed serious concerns that allowing coverage for
intentional bad acts will encourage wrongdoing, undermine the
punitive aspects of tort, and transgress the moral norms against
allowing bad actors to indemnify their misdeeds. As an Illinois
appellate court wrote:
An agreement to indemnify against intentional misconduct
would, as a general rule, be contrary to public policy and
unenforceable . . . . Violent criminals should not be permitted to
profit from their own intentional misconduct. Furthermore,
exclusions for intentional acts are necessary to help insurers set

52. Id. § 63, at 382.
53. ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL
PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES § 5.3(f), at 493 (1988) (“Losses which
are intentionally caused by an insured generally are not covered by liability insurance, and this rule
applies even when there is no clause in the applicable insurance policy that expressly excludes coverage
for injuries intentionally inflicted . . . .”); 451 1 ROBERT H. JERRY, NEW APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE
LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 1.05(2(a)) (Francis J. Mootz, III ed.); JERRY, supra note 51, § 63, at 382–83
(“The public policy underlying the fortuity requirement is so strong that if the insurance policy itself
does not expressly require that the loss be accidental courts will imply such a requirement.”).
54. KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 53, § 5.3(f), at 493 n.1 (“There is a relative dearth of direct
authority for an implied exception of this nature, in part because of the fact that liability policies almost
uniformly include express [exclusions for intentional acts].”).
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rates and supply coverage. If a single insured is allowed through
intentional acts to consciously control risks covered by the
55
policy, the central concept of insurance is violated.

The Supreme Court of Oregon stated the punishment rationale
more starkly: “[P]unishment rather than deterrence is the real basis
upon which coverage should be excluded. A person should suffer the
financial consequences flowing from his intentional conduct and
should not be reimbursed for his loss, even though he bargains for it
in the form of a contract of insurance.”56
In short, courts and policy makers express fears about adverse
selection, moral hazard, and the moral implication of liability
insurance. These are a similar set of fears that are often attributed to
insurers. As I will discuss in Section III below, these fears may be
overstated in most contexts. Thus, both the explicit and implicit bans
on coverage are somewhat unfounded. For now, though, it is enough
to understand that the bans exist as both a matter of contract and, in
many jurisdictions, common law.
3. The Quest for Coverage
Victims, courts, and policy-makers have, in some instances,
attempted to work around the fact that individual defendants have no
collectable assets and lack liability insurance for intentional
wrongdoing. They have generally employed three strategies to create
coverage: underlitigating, expanding the scope of derivative or
vicarious liability, and twisting the meaning of “intent” in insurance
contracts. While the number of suits employing such strategies is
likely very small compared to the total number of intentional torts,57
the proliferation and prevalence of these strategies highlight the fact
that insurance is the key to liability. That is, rather than suggesting

55. Lincoln Logan Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fornshell, 722 N.E.2d 239, 242 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (citations
omitted).
56. Isenhart v. Gen. Cas. Co., 377 P.2d 26, 28 (Or. 1962).
57. See generally supra note 21.
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the legal system is adapting to the remedial gap, these workarounds
suggest the opposite—the system is deeply flawed.
To get around the fact that liability insurance will not cover
intentionally caused harms, plaintiffs may “underlitigate” their claim.
They “plead and prove negligence rather than or in addition to
intentional tort” as a means of avoiding intentional tort exclusions in
liability insurance policies.58 Think back to the hypothetical in the
introduction. Rather than claim that you intentionally swung the
shovel that hit him in the head, the third brother could plead that you
negligently swung the shovel; swung the shovel purposefully, but
without the requisite intent to cause harm; or lacked the mental
capacity to form intent.59 Each of these alternative counts could, if
proven, be covered by a liability insurance policy. But the pleader
need not win on the lesser claim to be successful. The goal of
underpleading is to involve the insurer in the dispute. Simply by
pleading counts that are plausibly covered by the insurance policy,
the plaintiff triggers the insurers’ duty to defend and creates
incentives to settle.60 Even in cases of questionable coverage,
triggering the duty to defend can help plaintiffs access insurance
funds in three ways: (1) insurers may want to settle for nuisance
value (anything under the insurer’s anticipated cost of defense or out
of a concern that a failure to settle might create bad faith liability);
“(2) the carrier might wrongfully refuse to defend and be ‘estopped’
from contesting coverage; and (3) the insurer might defend but fail to
adequately reserve its rights to contest coverage, thus finding itself
estopped from later contesting coverage.”61
Plaintiffs, courts, and policy-makers have created another way to
avoid the ban on liability insurance; they have increased the scope of
58. Ellen S. Pryor, The Stories We Tell: Intentional Harm and the Quest for Insurance Funding, 75
TEX. L. REV. 1721, 1722 (1997). According to Pryor, plaintiffs use underlitigation strategies throughout
a lawsuit: in the pleadings, in presentation of proof, in instructions submitted to jury, in settlement
agreements, and in arguments and proof presented in a suit between the insurer and the insured over
coverage. Id. at 1729.
59. Id. at 1721–22 (providing examples of underlitigated claims).
60. See id. at 1729. The duty to defend arises when “the plaintiff’s pleadings make allegations that, if
true, would create liability that is covered by the policy.” Id. at 1730. When the duty arises, the insurer
must provide the insured with litigation insurance. Id.
61. Id. at 1736.
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derivative and vicarious liability. For example, many states have
enacted parental liability statutes, such that “parents are responsible
for the torts of their children without qualification as to the nature of
the tort or limitation on the amount of damages.”62 Courts have
likewise expanded the scope of common law doctrines to create
liability for the negligent supervision of children and for liability of a
spouse’s misconduct.63 As to the latter, courts are increasingly
willing “to characterize a wife’s indifference to her husband’s
criminal tendencies as an affirmative act, particularly when involving
claims of child sexual molestation.”64 Courts are likewise
increasingly willing “to sustain negligence claims against spouses on
failure to warn grounds for acts of pedophilia by their mates.”65 This
goes along with premises liability—in which family members could
be liable for acts in their home, or bar owners for acts in their bar.66
In each of these cases, the individual insured is liable for the
intentional tort of another. In these situations courts typically allow
coverage because the harm is “is appropriately viewed as a fortuitous
occurrence from the point of view of the insured, as well as the
victim.”67
The last strategy relates to the construction of insurance contracts.
When confronted with the fact that a plaintiff will have no
compensation, courts have stretched the meaning of intent to create
coverage where the plain language of a policy might suggest
otherwise.68 Specifically, courts have narrowly construed the
meaning of what is “expected or intended” from the standpoint of the
insured. “As a general rule, courts do not allow insurers to avoid
coverage where the insured’s conduct, though intentional, was not
intended to cause injury.”69 Additionally, some courts allow coverage
when the insured intended some injury, but not the specific injury
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
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that ultimately occurs.70 For example, even if you intentionally
swung the shovel, the third brother may argue that you did not intend
to cause injury or cause the specific injury that occurred. This
phenomenon fits hand-in-glove with the underpleading strategy
described above.
It is difficult to know how often these strategies are successfully
employed to create insurance coverage and thus compensation.
Likewise, it is difficult to know how often plaintiffs cannot utilize
one of these strategies and thus receive no compensation from an
otherwise judgment-proof defendant.71 However, it seems relatively
clear that these strategies are not covering all victims of intentional
torts, nor could they. The need to resort to these workarounds
suggests that insurance coverage is important and unavailable in a
number of situations; tort is failing to compensate some victims of
intentional torts; and that plaintiffs, courts, and policy-makers are
warping tort doctrine and the meaning of insurance contracts in an
attempt to create compensation for innocent victims of intentional
torts.
B. Gaps in the First Party Insurance Regime
Another significant part of the compensatory fabric is first party
insurance, insurance an individual purchases to protect against his
own explicit losses. First party insurance is supposed to protect
communal welfare by protecting against catastrophic losses and can
fill in where the tort system cannot provide remedies.72 For instance,
one can obtain first party insurance to protect against events that are
no one else’s fault, like fires, floods, or medical emergencies. By
purchasing first party insurance, individuals give up some portion of
their income in exchange for financial security. The insured spreads

70. See id. at 133–34.
71. See generally Pryor, supra note 58, at 1723 (stating that “empirical answer[s]” are not available
to describe the “operation of the tort liability system”); Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything
About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992).
72. See generally Mary Coate McNeely, Illegality as a Factor in Liability Insurance, 41 COLUM. L.
REV. 26, 26 (1941) (summarizing the state of the law regarding intentional torts and insurance).
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the risk of harm ex ante and obtains compensation ex post in the
event of significant losses.
But this too is a hollow story for victims of intentional torts. First,
most people do not purchase sufficient first party life insurance,73
health insurance,74 or other first party insurance in high-risk, lowprobability situations.75 Further, even if individuals demanded
sufficient first party insurance to adequately compensate losses from
intentional torts, they could not spread the risk of the largest category
of losses: noneconomic losses. While first party private or public
health insurance may cover some losses related to injuries,
unemployment, disability, and property damage (like stolen
automobiles or homes burned by arson, among others), the coverage
is limited to the economic losses—the value of the services provided
and the property lost. That is, first party insurance generally only
covers monetary or fair market losses such as the fair market value of
medical services, damaged or stolen property, or lost wages.
Although there is no legal obstacle to doing so—unlike the implicit
ban on providing liability insurance for intentional acts—insurers
will likely not provide coverage for noneconomic losses, such as pain
and suffering.76 Insurers are said to assert two reasons that they will
not sell insurance for noneconomic injuries: adverse selection and
moral hazard.
At this point, I lay out the conventional wisdom with respect to
adverse selection and moral hazard. In Part III.C., I will revisit these
claims and provide responses.
Adverse selection refers to the “[theoretical] tendency for high-risk
people to be more interested in insurance than low-risk people.”77
73. See Kyle D. Logue, The Current Life Insurance Crisis: How the Law Should Respond, 32 CUMB.
L. REV. 1, 3 (2001).
74. See Tom Baker & Peter Siegelman, Tontines for the Invincibles: Enticing Low Risks into the
Health-Insurance Pool with an Idea from Insurance History and Behavioral Economics, 2010 WIS. L.
REV. 79, 81 (showing that young people are likely to opt out of health insurance).
75. See infra notes 204–06 and accompanying text.
76. This can also present problems in the property context, especially when the destroyed or stolen
property holds value to the owner beyond market value. For example, a wedding ring, family heirloom,
or personal computer may all hold value to the insured beyond the market value of the property. An
insurance company, however, will not insure that extra value.
77. TOM BAKER, INSURANCE LAW AND POLICY 6 (2d ed. 2008).
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This is caused, in part, because insurers cannot distinguish between,
and thus set different premium rates for, good risks and bad risks.
This makes insurance more enticing for bad risks. Consider the
simple example offered by Howard Kunreuther and Mark Pauly:
suppose in a fire insurance context that some homes have a low
probability of suffering damage, say 1 in 10, and some homes have a
high probability of suffering damage, say 3 in 10.78 Suppose further
that the loss would be $100 for each group. If there are an equal
number in both risk classes, the actuarially fair premium is $20. For
the high-risk group, this is a bargain, because their expected loss is
$30 ($100 * .3). The low risks, however, only have an expected loss
of $10 ($100 * .1),
so they would have to be extremely risk averse to be interested in
paying [$]20 for coverage. If only the poor risks purchase
coverage, the insurer will suffer an expected loss of - [$]10, (i.e.
[$]20 - [$]30), on every policy it sells, due to an inability to
79
distinguish good from bad risks.

As the example highlights, adverse selection is really a problem of
information asymmetry: the insured presumably knows more about
his own riskiness than the insurer.80 Under this account, “[w]hen an
insurer [cannot] distinguish among potential insureds, a
disproportionately high percentage of applications for insurance will
usually come from the less desirable applicants because they get a
better bargain.”81 Economists typically predict that adverse selection
will lead to dire consequences for insurers and insureds alike. Good
risks will exit the insurance market because the product is too
78. Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Insurance Decision-Making and Market Behavior, 1 FOUND.
& TRENDS MICROECONOMICS 76, 100 (2005).
79. Id.; see also Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance
Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976) (developing
this theory more formally).
80. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality, Uncertainty, and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (summarizing economic models where “‘trust’ is
important”); Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 113
YALE L.J. 1223 (2004) (arguing that the problem of adverse selection is overstated).
81. KEETON & WIDDIS, supra note 53, § 1.3(c), at 14.
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expensive, leaving only the bad risks behind.82 This creates a “death
spiral,” where the “average quality of those insureds remaining falls
and prices rise in a vicious circle . . . .”83
The conventional wisdom posits that there is just this kind of
information asymmetry and adverse selection problem in the market
for first party insurance for noneconomic injuries. The problem is
simply illustrated. The pain one individual feels from a broken leg
may be vastly different from another. Some amputees will feel
phantom pain—pain from the missing limb—for long periods, while
others will feel none. Given that injuries are individuated, insurance
companies are said to believe that they do not have the data they need
to set individual rates. While insurers could likely determine the
probability that an individual will suffer noneconomic damages over
the lifetime of the insurance policy and also determine the average
size of an award for any given injury, they could not verify whether
any individual actually feels a given injury and cannot distinguish
between those likely to suffer more or less when selling the
insurance. That data is squarely locked inside the brains of the
insureds.
In theory, if the insurer charges an actuarially fair premium—that
is, a premium that accurately reflects the probability of an injury in
the period the premium covers and the average amount of damage
suffered—that takes into account both those who suffer more and
those who suffer less, only those who suffer more will purchase
insurance. Those who suffer less would not be interested in paying
premiums to recover significantly less than their expected harm.84 As
with all adverse selection problems, insurers may fear that this will
cause insurance rates to spiral upwards, pushing better and better
risks out of the market.85

82. See Siegelman, supra note 80, at 1224.
83. Id.
84. See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 78, at 100.
85. See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text. This same fear is not present in the third party
insurance context because insurers anticipate that their insureds will be no more likely to injure someone
who suffers significantly than someone who suffers only minimally.
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The moral hazard problem is likewise reasonably clear. Moral
hazard, broadly speaking, is the concern that, “if people are insured
against a particular harm, they will be less likely to avoid that harm,
may even suffer it purposely, and may exaggerate their losses once
they suffer it.”86 The first two are examples of ex ante moral hazard:
“the reduction in precautions taken by the insured to prevent the loss,
because of the existence of insurance.”87 The last is an example of ex
post moral hazard: “the increase in claims against the insurance
policy beyond the services the claimant would purchase if not
insured.”88
Insurers fear ex post moral hazard—that their insureds will claim
more damages than their actual loss because they have insurance. In
fact, insurers may assume that once injured, their insureds will claim
the maximum they can claim for noneconomic losses, no matter what
their actual injuries are. Consider it from the perspective of an insurer
and think of how an insurance contract for first party noneconomic
insurance would work. First, an insurer would have to determine
which events would trigger coverage. If the intent is to cover as many
injuries as possible, the triggering event cannot be limited to physical
injuries, for certainly victims of harassment, assault, or defamation
face potentially significant injuries. Yet there must be some limit.
Insurers should not have to compensate for the mental anguish that
an insured feels over an argument with a friend or a negative
employment evaluation. But even after the insurer adequately limits
the triggering event, the insurance company still may find it difficult
to assess damages. Once the insured can demonstrate that the trigger
has taken place, the insurance company has to assume that the
insured will claim up to the policy limits for each event. Unlike a
claim for property loss or property damage, where an adjuster can
inspect the damage or verify receipts, an insurance company has no

86. Wriggins, supra note 12, at 161.
87. George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521, 1547
(1987).
88. Id.
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real way of knowing whether the insured’s claims to noneconomic
damages are legitimate.89
In sum, first party insurance serves an important function in the
compensatory system. It allows individuals to invest current dollars
to protect against future catastrophic loss. First party insurance,
however, will only cover economic losses. This means that in the
context of intentional torts, potential victims can purchase insurance
to cover medical bills arising from injury, unemployment or
disability insurance to cover lost wages, or property insurance to
cover stolen goods. Unfortunately, first party insurance has two
significant limitations. First, many people are underinsured—they
don’t have sufficient insurance to cover all of the economic losses
associated with crime. Moreover, no matter how much coverage an
individual has, insurance won’t cover the largest portion of losses
associated with crime, noneconomic losses. In the context of
intentional torts, this leaves some $355 billion uncovered each year.
For example, each of the 200,000 annual victims of rape will suffer
over $80,000 of noneconomic damages. Each of the 4.1 million
victims of assault will suffer close to $8,000 of noneconomic
damage.90 And so on. Conventional wisdom posits that first party
insurance cannot cover these losses. There is, however, no legal
barrier to doing so and as I will show in Section III, the commonly
asserted economic and moral reasons are likely overstated or easily
worked around.
C. Limitations of the Victims’ Rights Movement
In the 1970s, an alliance of feminist scholars and groups
advocating that the government take a tougher stance on crime joined
together in what came to be seen as the victims’ rights movement.91
This movement proposed a number of reforms to the criminal justice
system to make the system “more sensitive to victims’ needs and
89. This is likely also a fear in the third party liability insurance context, where insurers assume that
some injured parties will overclaim because the tortfeasors have adequate insurance to cover the losses.
90. See COHEN, supra note 5, at 42–47; RAND, supra note 21, at 1.
91. Edna Erez & Julian Roberts, Victim Participation in the Criminal Justice System, in VICTIMS OF
CRIME 277, 279 (Robert C. Davis et al. eds., 3d ed. 2007).
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concerns.”92 One of the primary planks of this movement was a
notion that the government ought to take an active role in creating
remedies for victims of crimes.93 The movement argued that the
government had to step in because civil remedies were inadequate
and the state had a duty to protect its citizens based on the
sociological belief that society was responsible for crime.94 Without a
doubt, the victims’ rights movement has had significant successes,
including getting wide acceptance for victim restitution programs and
victim compensation funds. But these outgrowths of the movement
are deeply flawed as a means of providing financial remedies.
1. Victim Restitution
Under a victim restitution program, a judge may order a convicted
criminal to compensate his victims for the losses resulting from the
commission of a crime.95 Because these orders are part of sentencing,
the government—not the victim or a private attorney—must establish
the amount of the loss and collect the penalties.96 This provides a
significant advantage over the civil system because the victim can
92. Id.
93. Id. There were also nonfinancial goals of the victims’ rights movement. For instance, these
groups also have advocated to give a significant voice to the victims and to create greater victim
satisfaction with the criminal justice system. Those goals are not necessarily undermined by a failure to
create financial remedies.
94. See generally Arthur J. Goldberg, Preface to Symposium, Governmental Compensation to
Victims of Violence, 43 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1970); LeRoy L. Lamborn, The Propriety of Governmental
Compensation of Victims of Crime, 41 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 446 (1972) [hereinafter Lamborn,
Propriety]; LeRoy L. Lamborn, Remedies for the Victims of Crime, 43. S. CAL. L. REV. 22 (1970)
[hereinafter Lamborn, Remedies]. But see ROGER E. MEINERS, VICTIM COMPENSATION 1–5 (1978)
(rebutting those arguments).
95. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-01-664, CRIMINAL DEBT: OVERSIGHT AND ACTIONS
NEEDED TO ADDRESS DEFICIENCIES IN COLLECTION PROCESSES 27 (2001), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d01664.pdf. See also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2006).
96. There are some concerns about the constitutionality of restitution requirements. For example,
some have argued that a retroactive application of a mandatory restitution statute violates the Ex Post
Facto Clause, while others argue that it violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. See Irene J.
Chase, Comment, Making the Criminal Pay in Cash: The Ex Post Facto Implications of the Mandatory
Victims Restitution Act of 1996, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 463 (2001); Brian Kleinhaus, Note, Serving Two
Masters: Evaluating the Criminal or Civil Nature of the VWPA and MVRA Through the Lens of the Ex
Post Facto Clause, the Abatement Doctrine, and the Sixth Amendment, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2711
(2005); Melanie D. Wilson, In Booker’s Shadow: Restitution Forces a Second Debate on Honesty in
Sentencing, 39 IND. L. REV. 379 (2006). These arguments are beyond the scope of this Article. The
focus here is on the efficacy, not the constitutionality, of restitution.
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avoid the costs associated with obtaining a judgment and pursuing
collection actions. Despite this advantage, victim restitution still
cannot provide real financial remedies to innocent victims. There are
four significant drawbacks to victim restitution programs.97
First, victim restitution statutes typically only target the economic
portion of loss. Most restitution statutes allow restitution for medical
expenses, lost wages, counseling expenses, funeral expenses, lost or
damaged property, or other direct out-of-pocket losses.98 In some
states, courts have taken an expansive view of these categories. For
example, some states have ordered that restitution cover travel
expenses as a part of the costs of a funeral or reasonable attorneys
fees to close the victim’s estate.99 These are, however, still limited
remedies. States do not allow restitution to cover noneconomic losses
like pain, suffering, or loss of enjoyment of life.
Second, and more importantly, even if restitution covered all
losses, having a restitution order does not guarantee that a victim will
actually be able to collect any money. Most criminal defendants have
few collectable assets.100 Consider the experience of the federal
government. Congress passed the first federal restitution statute in
1982 as one of several legislative responses to the victims’ rights
movement.101 That statute explicitly authorized courts to impose
97. Nearly every state and the federal government have some form of a victim restitution program.
See Office for Victims of Crime, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Ordering Restitution to the Crime Victim, LEGAL
SERIES
BULL.,
no.
6,
Nov.
2002,
at
1,
https://www.ncjrs.gov/ovc_archives/bulletins/legalseries/bulletin6/ncj189189.pdf.
98. See id. at 2. See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3663(b) (laying out appropriate categories for restitution).
99. See Office for Victims of Crime, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 97, at 3.
100. Most incoming inmates have limited earning capacities even prior to being arrested. In 2002,
29% of incoming inmates reported being unemployed at the time of their arrest. See DORIS J. JAMES,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., PROFILE OF JAIL INMATES, 2002, at 9 (2004),
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/pji02.pdf. Additionally, even including those who
were previously employed, 59.1% of incoming inmates made less than $1,000 in the month before their
arrest. See id. Out of that 59.1%, 76% made less than $600 in the month before they were arrested. See
id. Moreover, the average inmate’s earning capacity drops 10–20% upon release. See THOMAS
MACLELLAN, NAT’L GOVERNOR’S ASS’N, NGA CTR. FOR BEST PRACTICES, THE CHALLENGES AND
IMPACTS
OF
PRISONER
REENTRY
2
(2004),
available
at
http://www.nga.org/files/live/sites/NGA/files/pdf/REENTRYBACKGROUND.pdf.
101. See Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 5, 96 Stat. 1248, 1255
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3664 (2006)); see also Matthew Dickman, Comment, Should Crime
Pay? A Critical Assessment of the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act of 1996, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1687,
1688 (2009).
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restitution as a part of sentencing, but placed significant limitations
on the court’s discretion to make such an order.102 In particular,
courts had to consider “the financial resources of the defendant, [and]
the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the
defendant’s dependents.”103 Fourteen years later, disappointed with
the compensation provided by the 1982 statute, Congress took the
discretion out of the hands of the judges.104 Under the 1996
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), Congress required the
courts to order restitution for any crime of violence, drug crime, or
consumer product tampering regardless of the offender’s ability to
pay.105 But this broad expansion of restitution orders has done little to
create new compensation for victims. Instead, all that has increased is
the size of the uncollected debt. In the years since the passage of the
MVRA, annual unpaid criminal debt has increased every year.106 In
fiscal year 2009, courts ordered $7.5 billion of restitution to victims
of crime, of which only $380 million was collected.107 This is a yield
of only 5%.
This is not surprising. As detailed by the General Accounting
Office (GAO), most of this debt is simply uncollectable because it
“involves criminals who may be incarcerated or deported or who
have minimal earning capacity” and because “state laws . . . may
limit the type of property that can be seized and the amount of wages
that can be garnished.”108 Even when defendants should have money
available to pay restitution, as with financial fraud, offenders often
find ways to effectively shield assets.109 This, of course, mirrors the
102. Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, § 5, 96 Stat. 1248, 1248.
103. Dickman, supra note 101, at 1688 (quoting Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L.
No. 97-291, § 5, 96 Stat. at 1255).
104. Id. at 1691.
105. See 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c) (2006).
106. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-338, CRIMINAL DEBT: ACTIONS STILL NEEDED TO
ADDRESS DEFICIENCIES IN JUSTICE’S COLLECTION PROCESSES 8 (2004), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04338.pdf.
107. EXEC. OFFICE FOR U.S. ATT’YS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ ANNUAL
STATISTICAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 92 tbl.8b (2009), available at
http://www.justice.gov/usao/reading_room/reports/asr2009/09statrpt.pdf.
108. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 95, at 10; see also supra notes 36–45 and
accompanying text.
109. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-05-80, CRIMINAL DEBT: COURT-ORDERED
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reasons that plaintiffs’ attorneys won’t proceed in tort against a
defendant without liability insurance or other collectable assets. Here,
there is an additional problem. After the offender has completed
supervised release or probation, courts have no real power to enforce
the restitution order.110
Third, although the federal government requires victim restitution,
many state and local courts do not require restitution. For example, in
2004, in the seventy-five largest jurisdictions, courts ordered
restitution in only 14% of murder cases, 16% of rape and sexual
assault cases, 15% of aggravated assault cases, and 24% of burglary
cases.111 But these figures still overestimate the number of offenders
made to pay, because fourth, most offenders will never face a
restitution order. The police do not catch most offenders, and those
who are apprehended often settle with plea bargains that do not
include restitution.112
In short, victim restitution provides one significant advantage over
tort: the government, rather than the victim, obtains the judgment and
attempts to collect. The government can do this without concern as to
whether the offender has funds to satisfy a judgment (a luxury private
victims and attorneys likely cannot afford). Further, because the
government can seek restitution as a part of the criminal proceeding,
it avoids the costs of a separate civil proceeding. This could save the
victim the time and expense of establishing liability and trying to
collect damages (tasks private attorneys would likely be unwilling to
do). But this does not change the underlying reality. Many offenders
are never caught or ordered to pay restitution. Those who are ordered
to pay are only required to pay economic damages and are unlikely to
be able to do even that. Defendants with no assets or shielded assets
cannot, or will not, compensate victims with real losses. Thus, victim
restitution does not, and likely cannot, provide an adequate remedy to
victims of crime.
RESTITUTION AMOUNTS FAR EXCEED LIKELY COLLECTIONS FOR THE CRIME VICTIMS IN SELECTED
FINANCIAL FRAUD CASES 11 (2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d0580.pdf.
110. Id. at 11–12.
111. ANDREW KARMEN, CRIME VICTIMS: AN INTRODUCTION TO VICTIMOLOGY 346 (7th ed. 2010)
112. Id. at 344.
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2. Victim Compensation Funds
Victims of crimes have another way to obtain financial relief:
victim compensation funds.113 Victims can generally apply to these
funds for compensation for some losses that result directly from
criminal victimization. These funds offer one significant
improvement over either tort or victim restitution. To even entertain
the thought of obtaining a remedy through tort or restitution, the
tortfeasor has to be identified, caught, and found liable (or guilty).
Victim compensation funds, however, have no such requirement.
Despite this substantial advantage over both tort and restitution,
victim compensation funds likewise come up short.
Victim compensation funds are underutilized and underfunded. In
2002, compensation programs paid a total of only $454 million to a
total of 157,700 claimants. These are paltry numbers compared to the
estimated $460 billion price tag for crime and 23 million
victimizations.114 This represents less than 0.7% of victimizations
and less than 0.001% of the estimated annual costs of crime.
In large part, this gap can be explained by the limitations
governments place on most victim compensation funds. Like victim
restitution, almost no state or territory covers expense for
noneconomic losses.115 Most funds will only cover economic costs
113. In 1964 New Zealand created the first comprehensive governmental compensation system in the
common law world. See Lamborn, Propriety, supra note 94, at 449. In this country, like victim
restitution, these funds came in vogue in the 1970s and 1980s as part of the victims’ rights movement.
By 1978 nearly one-third of the states had adopted and many other states and the federal government
were considering similar victim compensation legislation. See Nancy Plunket Johnson & James Walker
Johnson, Comments, Compensation for Victims of Violent Crimes, 26 U. KAN. L. REV. 227, 227 (1978).
Today every state in the nation and the federal government offer some compensation benefits to victims
of crime. See generally Frequently Asked Questions: Benefits, NAT’L ASSOC. OF CRIME VICTIM COMP.
BDS., http://www.nacvcb.org/index.asp?bid=16 (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
114. See SUSAN HERMAN & MICHELLE WAUL, NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, REPAIRING THE
HARM: A NEW VISION FOR CRIME VICTIM COMPENSATION IN AMERICA 24, 33 n.20 (2004), available at
http://www.ncvc.org/ncvc/AGP.Net/Components/documentViewer/Download.aspxnz?DocumentID=38
573 (citing FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES:
2002 UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS (2003), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/ucr/crime-in-theu.s/2002/toc02.pdf).
115. See Frequently Asked Questions: Benefits, supra note 113. Hawaii, Tennessee, and the Virgin
Islands all allow some compensation for some form of noneconomic loss. Id. In these jurisdictions,
awards range from $550 to $5,000. Hawaii explicitly describes its awards as “symbolic” and not
intended to truly compensate the loss. HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 114, at 22. In Tennessee, payments
for noneconomic losses are restricted to victims of sexual assault. Id.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol28/iss3/12

34

Swedloff: Uncompensated Torts

2012]

UNCOMPENSATED TORTS

755

such as medical or dental expenses, lost wages or loss of support,
mental health counseling, and funeral and burial costs.116 Indeed,
over 40% of the expenses paid by compensation funds were for
medical or dental expenses; 25% were for lost wages or loss of
support; and 15% went to the cost of mental health services.117 Even
with these payments, victim compensation funds still come up pretty
small. Most compensation funds cap the size of awards, such that the
average maximum is between $25,000 and $35,000.118 “Few victims,
however, receive awards close to the maximum. The average award
per claim in 2002 was $2,900.”119 This likely fails to cover even the
economic portion of the loss. More importantly, these awards fail to
cover over three quarters of the estimated harm—the noneconomic
losses. The fact that victim compensation funds will pay for mental
health or counseling services is, of course, a step toward alleviating
some of the noneconomic damages incurred. But less than $68
million is spent on mental health aid, a laughably small sum
compared to the $355 billion of noneconomic losses.120
Moreover, it may be that victim compensation funds are
underutilized because crime victims don’t know that they are entitled
to make claims. According to the Urban Institute, 56% of
compensation administrators claim that eligible victims do not apply
for funds because they are not aware of their rights.121 More research
in this area would be helpful to see if increasing victims’ awareness
of the funds would yield additional claims by additional victims.

116. See OVC Fact Sheet: Crime Victims Fund, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/factshts/cvf2010/intro.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2011). While
there is significant variation on the types of expenses compensated from state to state, these are the most
commonly covered expenses. See Frequently Asked Questions: Benefits, supra note 113.
117. HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 114, at 22 fig.5.
118. There are both overall caps and caps for each sub-award. There is some variation in the
maximum award, but the average maximum is $25,000. Frequently Asked Questions: Benefits, supra
note 113; see also HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 114, at 24.
119. HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 114, at 24.
120. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 114, at 22 fig.5,
23–24. Herman and Waul posit that approximately 15% of victim compensation awards go toward
mental health aid, which amounts to $68 million out of a total of $454 million victim compensation
claims paid nationwide.
121. See id. at 29.
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Lastly, some of this underutilization has to do with preconditions
for compensation. To qualify for compensation, typically a victim
must report the crime to the police (usually within 72 hours of the
crime), file a timely claim with the compensation program (usually
ranging from one to two years after the crime), cooperate with the
police and prosecutors, sustain costs or losses not covered by other
collateral sources (such as private insurance, public insurance, or
restitution), and not be implicated in the crime.122 Many of these
preconditions are both important and obvious. For instance, it may
make sense to precondition compensation on cooperation with the
police.123 Nonetheless, the reporting requirement affects whether
these funds are available to victims of crime, because many victims
don’t report the crimes to the police.124
Even if compensation funds received more applicants and wanted
to provide additional compensation for noneconomic injuries and
above statutory caps, it is not clear that they could so. State
compensation funds are funded by both state and federal sources. All
of the federal funding and most of the state funding is generated from
offender fines and other penalties levied against offenders.125
122. See id. at 20–21; Frequently Asked Questions: Benefits, supra note 113.
123. Early proponents of these programs believed that the requirement that victims report the crime
would reduce the incidence of crime. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 94, at 2 (“By requiring victims to
report crimes promptly as a prerequisite to compensation, such a program could help law enforcement
authorities apprehend criminals. This requirement could reduce the crime rate in many ways: first,
prompt apprehension would remove from society criminals who would otherwise remain at large to
commit further crimes; second, the very prospect of more effective law enforcement would deter the
would-be violators from committing criminal acts.”).
124. The Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates that in 2002 only half of the
violent victimizations (2.7 million out of 5.4 million) and 40% of nonviolent victimizations (7.1 million
out of 17.5 million) were reported to police. HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 114, at 26 tbl.4 (citing
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES, 2002 STATISTICAL TABLES tbls.1, 91, 75, 78, 77, 83 & 87 (2003), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus02.pdf). For a more significant discussion of the survey
methods used by the Department of Justice to make these estimates, see RAND, supra note 31.
125. The Crime Victims Fund was established in October 1984 as a part of the Victims of Crime Act,
42 U.S.C. §10601 (2006). Deposits for the Crime Victims Fund come from “federal criminal fines (with
some exceptions); the proceeds of forfeited appearance bonds, bail bonds, and collateral; special
forfeitures of the collateral profits of crime proceeds retained in a an escrow account for more than 5
years; and newly created penalty assessments on federal misdemeanor and felony convictions.” STEVE
DERENE, NAT’L ASS’N OF VOCA ASSISTANCE ADM’RS, CRIME VICTIMS FUND REPORT: PAST PRESENT
AND FUTURE 2 (Mar. 2005), available at http://www.navaa.org/CVFReport/CrimeVictimsReport.pdf.
States are somewhat more diverse in their funding sources, but the majority of state funding also comes
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It is not clear that alone or together these federal and state sources
could come close to reaching the $460 billion price tag. Federal
funding presently provides 40% of the benefits paid from state victim
compensation funds, while states provide the remaining 60%.126 At
no time have the federal Crime Victims Fund and the matching state
programs come close to the approximately $460 billion worth of
injury or even the $355 billion of noneconomic injury caused by
crime. The amount of money deposited annually into the Crime
Victims Fund has fluctuated wildly since 1993. In the past ten years,
the deposits have hit a high of $1.746 billion in fiscal year 2009 and a
low of $361 million in fiscal year 2004.127 But even if the Crime
Victim Funds paid out all of its deposits from 2009 with the states
providing the full 60% match (an additional $2.91 billion), crime
victim funds would only have $4.66 billion to distribute.128 While
this is a significant amount of money, it is still only 1% of the
estimated harm of crime annually.
Without significantly more funding, there is no way to close the
compensation gap. It is not clear that fines and penalties alone can
provide enough funding to provide significant remedies. To provide
from fines and penalties levied against offenders. “Three-quarters of states fund their programs solely
with fines and penalties levied against offenders. Six states rely on a combination of tax dollars and
offender fines, while only seven states depend entirely on general revenue for the state portion of
funding.” HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 114, at 23.
126. DERENE, supra note 125, at 12. “For example, if a state spends $1 million in state funds to
compensate crime victims for their losses, it will receive a federal grant of $600,000 to supplement its
efforts.” HERMAN & WAUL, supra note 114, at 23.
127. OVC Fact Sheet: Crime Victims Fund, supra note 116; see also HERMAN & WAUL, supra note
114, at 23. These significant fluctuations are related to a relatively few cases in which the government
imposed large fines (over $100 million) and those fines were entirely or substantially paid off. See
DERENE, supra note 125, at 3. In an eight-year period from 1996 to 2004, $5.2 billion was deposited in
the Crime Victims Fund. Payments from only twelve defendants made up 45% ($2.3 billion) of those
deposits. Id. at 3–4. Five of those twelve defendants stemmed from just two federal investigations. In an
effort to curb the fluctuations and create a stable source of support for state programs, Congress
instituted an annual cap on funds available for distribution. See id. The 2010 fiscal year cap is $705
million. About OVC: Crime Victims Fund, OFFICE FOR VICTIMS OF CRIMES,
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/about/victimsfund.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2012).
128. By statute, the Crime Victims Fund must also provide grants, inter alia, under the Children’s
Justice Act to improve investigation and prosecution of child abuse in American Indian and Alaska
Native communities; to U.S. Attorneys’ offices to fund “victim-witness coordinators;” to fund FBI
victim-witness specialists; to fund the Federal Victim Notification System; and discretionary grants. See
generally OVC Fact Sheet: Crime Victims Fund, supra note 116. Thus, as presently constructed it could
not pay out all of its deposits.
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additional funding, federal and state governments would likely have
to create a dedicated payroll tax (as the federal government does with
social security) or tap general revenues. It is not clear that
governments will be willing to do so. I return to these questions in
Part III.B.
III. CREATING REMEDIES (AND THE REMEDIES NOT CREATED)
As discussed above, intentional torts impose significant private
costs. Tort fails to compensate victims for those losses in all but a
few cases (where the tortfeasor is very wealthy or where the victim
can under-plead her claim to trigger insurance coverage). While
victims may have some insurance to cover some tangible, out-ofpocket costs, this first party insurance is likely inadequate to meet all
of an insureds’ needs. Thus, victims are likely paying out-of-pocket
for at least some portion of their economic injuries. More
importantly, some $355 billion of noneconomic losses cannot be
compensated through first party insurance or otherwise.
In this section I discuss the opportunities for, and barriers to, using
insurance as a means of closing the remedial gap. I make three
proposals. The first is a plan to create liability insurance for
intentional acts. The second is to enhance victim compensation funds
to close the compensation gap. The third is to create a market for first
party insurance for noneconomic damages. Each of these ideas could
create compensation for otherwise uncompensated torts, but each
requires government support and shared sacrifice to work. This
section first describes the features of the proposals and then evaluates
the barriers. Ultimately, I am somewhat pessimistic about any of
these proposals gaining sufficient political support to be enacted.
Nonetheless, I suggest that legislatures should take this compensatory
gap seriously for three basic reasons. First, the current system leaves
millions who would otherwise be compensated without remedy.129
129. There may be distributive reasons to create remedies for victims of misfortune, as well as
mischief, but this is not the paper to distinguish between mischief and misfortune. See generally Jules
Coleman & Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune (Annual McGill Lecture in Jurisprudence and
Public Policy), 41 MCGILL L.J. 91 (1995). My focus is on closing the remedial gap for intentional torts.
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This undermines important expressive functions of tort law. Second,
crime prevention is a core governmental function. It may be the case
that some of these proposals will force the government to internalize
the costs created by a failure to prevent crime. Third, to the extent
these proposals include a private insurance element, these firms may
be a powerful crime-prevention lobby.
A. Liability Insurance for Intentional Torts
1. Outline of the Program
The first idea is to create remedies through liability insurance for
intentional torts. In short, states (or the federal government) would
require that everyone purchase liability insurance against intentional
torts. Liability insurance could either serve as a source of
compensation or serve to justify the investment in civil litigation.
This proposal parallels an earlier proposal by Jennifer Wriggins to
protect victims of domestic violence, and would require a number of
features to create a viable insurance pool without undermining the
deterrence and corrective justice functions of tort.130 First, as a means
of combating adverse or null selection, the federal government or the
states would require everyone to purchase insurance to cover liability
for his or her own intentional malfeasance.131 Second, insurers must
be allowed to recover (in subrogation) from policyholders the
amounts insurers paid out under the plans.132 Third, all policyholders
must purchase a required minimum amount of “uninsured assailant”
insurance.133 This “uninsured assailant” coverage would function like
130. See Wriggins, supra note 12 (proposing a “Domestic Violence Torts Insurance Plan”).
131. Wriggins likewise proposed a mandatory component to spread the risk of adverse selection.
Under Wriggins’s plan, regulators had to compel auto insurance plans—which are mandatory in most
states—to include a “required minimum amount of coverage for domestic violence torts, so that if a
policyholder is sued for such a tort, the automobile policy would cover the claim to the minimum.” Id. at
152. Wriggins hypothesized that reaching all drivers would include a sufficient number of insureds to
create a manageable risk pool. Id. at 151. It is not clear that auto insurance is pervasive enough—
especially in urban areas—to cover criminal actors to create sufficient remedies.
132. Id.
133. Tortfeasors could actively avoid coverage, deciding the insurance is too expensive, the risk of
sanction for not purchasing the insurance is too low, or the sanction itself is too low. It could also be that
some individuals are not required to purchase the insurance because of hardship or because they are
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uninsured auto insurance, and allow a victim to make claims against
his or her own policy when the defendant did not have liability
insurance.134 Fourth, insurers would have to exclude from coverage
victims who are also implicated in the crime. That is, those who are
jointly engaged in violence should not be able to recover under their
insurance policy. Lastly, and importantly, there would have to be
reasonably tight regulation of pricing to ensure consumer access.
While insurance companies typically set premiums based on the
probability that the insured will suffer or create a loss and the
expected magnitude of that loss, such an approach is likely to make
private insurance unaffordable for assailants and victims.135 If the
poor are more likely to commit crime, then the insurer would have to
charge them more for insurance.136 Further, if the poor are more
likely to be victims of crime, then the insurer may also have to charge
more for the uninsured/underinsured component of the product. This
might mean that the insurance itself becomes prohibitively
expensive.137
Each of these requirements is meant to deal with the primary
objections to creating liability insurance for intentional torts: adverse
foreign citizens, among other reasons.
134. Wriggins, supra note 12, at 153–54. As in the auto insurance context, the uninsured/underinsured
insurance would function as a hybrid of both first and third party insurance. It is like first party
insurance in that the “insurance benefits are paid by the insurance company to the persons who are
identified as insureds in the policy terms.” KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 53, § 4.9(e)(1), at 399. But,
like third party insurance, it “is fault-based,” and the insureds only receive coverage “when they are
legally entitled to recover damages from an uninsured [perpetrator].” Id.
135. Of course, insurers also take into account administrative costs and an acceptable profit. See
Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 78, at 71–72. For now, however, it is easier to simply consider the
probability and magnitude of loss as the key determinants in setting premiums.
136. The more likely the insured is to suffer or create a loss, the greater the risk, and the higher the
premium. See KEETON & WIDISS, supra note 53, §1.3(a)(1), at 8 n.1 (“A prediction concerning potential
loss, partly reasoned from things known and partly predicated on guesswork, is generally understood as
the ‘risk’ that is the basis of the computation of a premium that an insured pays to the insurer to acquire
insurance.”). Typically, insurance companies attempt to price policies individually by classifying risks
according to relevant categories. For example, an insurance company will likely charge an eighteenyear-old young man more for auto insurance than a fifty-five year-old woman, because teenage boys are
more likely to get into accidents than middle-aged women. Further, someone who has a history of
getting into accidents will likely pay more in premiums than a demographically similar person who has
a clean driving record. Indeed, risk classification such as this can help alleviate moral hazard problems
by forcing individuals to consider internalizing some portion of the harm created through anticipation of
higher future premiums.
137. Alternatively, the government would have to subsidize the payments for the poor.
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selection, moral hazard, and moral discomfort. Beyond that, these
requirements deal with the specific problems associated with a
distributive model such as this by creating coverage and making that
coverage affordable. What follows is a brief discussion of how the
features of this proposal deal with the common objections.
(a) Adverse Selection, Null Selection, and Compulsory
Insurance
Insurers may be concerned that only those who are most likely to
commit intentional torts would purchase the insurance.138 This would
mean that the insurance pool would include more bad risks—those
who will commit torts and thus incur liability—than good risks—
those who will not. In this event, premiums would rise to cover the
costs, forcing more good risks out of the insurance pool on the
assumption that as a good risk he or she can self-insure against a loss
that can be easily prevented (by not committing intentional torts).
According to this theory, the bad risks, then worse risks, will remain
in the pool and create a death spiral for the insurance product.139
Even this gloomy picture isn’t the likely scenario for intentional
torts. Rather, the real problem is that neither good nor bad risks will
want to purchase liability insurance for intentional torts. Good risks
obviously have no use for the insurance product. Why pay premiums
for an eventuality that the potential purchaser can avoid with near
certainty? They can simply choose not to commit intentional torts.
Even the most risk averse in this group would see little need for this
type of insurance. What is strange is that even the bad risks—those
who will commit intentional torts—also have little use for the
product. Liability insurance is meant to protect the insured from
liability to a third party. As it stands now, there is almost no chance
of civil liability, and the government rarely recovers on its restitution
claims. As such, there is little actual financial liability for intentional
138. Indeed, insurers and policy makers consistently express concern about adverse selection in the
design and regulation of insurance markets. See Siegelman, supra note 80, at 1226–31 (detailing how
policy makers and courts “deploy” concerns about adverse selection “to trump other concerns that might
inform policymaking or legal analysis”).
139. See supra notes 80–83 and accompanying text.
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tortfeasors and there is no reason for an intentional tortfeasor to
purchase insurance to cover his intentional acts.
Thus, null selection—not adverse selection—is the real problem
for liability insurance for intentional torts. That is, no one would
purchase the insurance. But the compulsory nature of this product
eliminates the adverse and null selection problem. If everyone has to
purchase the insurance, insurers will have a sufficiently diverse
insurance pool to keep prices low.140
(b) Controlling the Fear of Moral Hazard
All insurance raises concerns about moral hazard, and liability
insurance—whether it covers negligence or intentional acts—is no
exception.141 In the context of liability insurance, it is easy to
understand why insurance could create moral hazard. The
conventional economic view of tort law is that liability, or the
expectation of liability, creates incentives for a potential tortfeasor to
140. There is some support for the proposition that the fear of adverse selection is overemphasized.
Siegelman, supra note 80, at 1225. Adverse selection is really a problem of information asymmetry—
the insured, in theory, knows more about herself than the insurance company. In most contexts,
however, there is little empirical support for the proposition that insureds have more and better
information than insurance companies about their propensity for risk or propensity to encounter a loss
under the insurance policy. See id. at 1241–52. To the contrary, insurance companies are quite good at
using the public data they have to predict risk. See id. at 1245–53. Insurers have access to a significant
amount of public information, like age, experience, work history, and medical background. They also
have complex statistical models and years of experience collecting, managing, and using the data they
collect. This makes it possible for an insurer to properly price many risks, including the risk that a
potential insured will suffer a property loss, get in a car accident, or incur medical expenses.
Even though insureds obviously have information to which the insurer is not privy, simply having
private information does not create information asymmetry. To outpredict an insurance company, a
potential insured would have to accurately understand the private data, understand its importance, and
weight it correctly in a complex risk algorithm. See id. at 1241. Most insureds are likely unable to do
that because they typically encounter systematic biases that make it difficult to accurately predict their
propensity for risky behavior or price their own risks. See id. at 1245.
That said, it is not hard to imagine that adverse selection could be a problem in the context of
intentional torts. Even if most people don’t know their riskiness with respect to negligent driving or
mortality, it is not hard to imagine that people know whether they are likely to commit an intentional
tort. And even if insurance companies can use actuarial data (such as criminal record, age, or gender) to
predict a significant number of intentional torts, there is no doubt that an information asymmetry could
exist in this market.
141. See BAKER, supra note 12, at 72 (“Moral hazard—the tendency for insurance to reduce the
incentive to prevent loss—is a longstanding concern in all kinds of insurance, and liability insurance is
no exception.”); see also Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996);
Wriggins, supra note 12, at 161.
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take the optimal amount of care.142 Liability insurance is thought to
disrupt the relationship between liability and harm prevention
because the insurer, rather than the tortfeasor, pays for liability. That
is, insurance eliminates the deterrence function of tort, and creates
moral hazard.143
In this respect, though, liability insurance for intentional torts is no
different than any other liability insurance product. Insurance could
affect the behavior of both potential tortfeasors and potential victims
in both the intentional tort and negligence context, as well as the
behavior of someone who has life insurance, homeowners’ insurance,
and almost every insurance product extant. But, for a variety of
reasons, the fear of moral hazard associated with insurance for
intentional torts is likely exaggerated. And, to the extent that we
create such insurance (especially with the features proposed here), it
might create better deterrence signals than the present tort system.
First, it is unclear that tort currently sends significant deterrence
signals to people thinking of committing intentional torts. The notion
that civil liability sends deterrence signals depends, in no small part,
on potential tortfeasors believing that there will be financial
repercussions from tort if they harm another. It is not at all clear that
intentional tortfeasors, especially repeat offenders, have that belief.
There are few civil lawsuits for intentional acts against individuals
who commit intentional torts.144 Without lawsuits, tortfeasors do not
face actual or expected liability, do not internalize the expected
external costs, and have no incentive to take additional care. In short,
142. In economic terms, a potential tortfeasor will take precaution to avoid tort liability when it is cost
effective to do so. Tort liability forces tortfeasors to internalize (or at least consider the danger of
internalizing) tort liability. If tort liability is higher than the cost of the precaution, tortfeasors will invest
in precaution (or so the theory goes). In other words, tort liability serves as a deterrent to potential
tortfeasors.
143. Most of the following discussion focuses on the behavior of the tortfeasor. There may also be a
fear that potential victims will not take precaution to avoid harm if they can fully recover. This seems to
be an unlikely concern in the area of intentional torts. Most people likely want to avoid the kinds of
injuries at issue here—those severe enough to cause enough noneconomic injury (given that most
individuals can obtain first party insurance for economic damages). Further, insurance companies can
structure policies to avoid full compensation. Insurers can force the injured party to bear some portion of
the costs through deductibles or higher premiums for successive losses. This should minimize moral
hazard issues for victims.
144. See supra Part II.A.
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creating liability insurance will not eliminate existing financial
disincentives for intentional bad behavior, because there are no such
disincentives now.
Second, liability insurance will not remove the most significant
deterrence signal—the threat of criminal sanctions. Most intentional
torts are also criminal acts, with corresponding criminal punishments
like incarceration, restrictions on liberty such as probation, and fines.
Criminal sanctions can also negatively impact one’s reputation,
standing, and future economic outlook.145 And, while it may be true
that some intentional tortfeasors face civil liability, the financial
burden likely adds only a modicum of additional disincentive to this
already significant list.146
Third, rather than eliminating deterrence from tort law, insurance
may actually create a means to place financial responsibility on
wrongdoers. With liability insurance in place, the civil tort system
can spring into action. Intentional tort lawsuits become economically
viable and attractive to plaintiffs and contingency fee lawyers. As
such, victims can get both blood money and insurance proceeds from
tortfeasors.147 “Even a small blood money payment is more than the
zero payment that would be assessed when a plaintiff cannot bring a
tort action because there is no liability insurance policy [in place] that
makes the claim worthwhile for a contingent fee lawyer.”148 Thus,
there will be some financial deterrent signal sent to potential
tortfeasors.
This doesn’t eliminate the possibility that some defendants—those
who are wealthy enough to compensate their victims—may escape
significant blood money payments that they would otherwise have to
pay in the absence of insurance. For these defendants, insurers
145. See supra note 100.
146. See BAKER, supra note 12, at 72 (“Given almost any prospect of criminal law enforcement
involving imprisonment, the presence or absence of liability insurance seems likely to affect only
slightly the expected cost of crime . . . .”). Said differently, the expected cost of crime is mostly made up
of the anticipated cost of the criminal sanction. Most intentional tortfeasors likely consider civil liability
a very small additional cost of the intentional act, because (a) the cost of civil liability (should it be
imposed) relative to the cost of criminal punishment is small, and (b) the likelihood of any civil liability
being imposed at all is miniscule.
147. For a discussion of “blood money,” see supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.
148. BAKER, supra note 12, at 74.
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themselves may be best able to send the proper deterrence signals.
Insurers have a number of methods to help deal with the problems
created by moral hazard. For example, insurers can raise deductibles,
and thus force additional blood money from defendants. Insurers can
raise the price of a policy based on bad actions, or encourage good
behavior by promising to lower the price of the policy for extended
periods of good behavior.149
More importantly, if given the right to subrogate claims against
their own insureds, the insurer can eliminate this fear altogether.150
Subrogation allows an insurer “to ‘stand in the shoes’ of its
policyholder for purposes of collecting from a tort defendant what it
paid on the policyholder’s behalf.”151 For example, where an insured
is injured in an auto accident because of a third party’s negligent
driving, the insurer could first compensate the insured and then sue
the negligent driver to recover for its payment to the insured.
Typically an insurer may not assert subrogation rights against its own
insured.152 But allowing an insurer to subrogate the claim of the third
party against its own insured would provide necessary compensation
to the victim and deterrence signals to the insured (when possible).153
The insurer would pay the victim under the policy. The insurer would
149. Given that everyone will have to purchase coverage, insurers may be limited in how much they
can differentiate risks. For example, it may be unwise to allow an insurer to charge an actuarially fair
price for a repeat violent offender. It is unlikely that such a person could afford the full premium.
Charging less may provide some minimal deterrence and keep the offender in the pool.
150. See BAKER, supra note 12, at 73; Wriggins, supra note 12, at 165.
151. BAKER, supra note 77, at 331–32; see also JERRY, supra note 51, § 96(a), at 600 (“Subrogation is
an equitable right that enables one who is secondarily liable for a debt and who pays it to succeed to the
rights, if any, that the creditors hold against the debtor.”).
152. JERRY, supra note 51, § 96(f), at 692. The basis of this rule may be that “allowing the insurer
subrogation against its own insured would allow the insurer to pass the loss from itself to its own
insured, thereby avoiding the coverage that the insured purchased.” Id. In cases where the insured causes
intentional harm, the public policy concerns prohibiting subrogation against an insured need not apply.
See generally Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Monets, 388 A.2d 603, 606 (N.J. 1977) (advocating an indemnify
and subrogate approach); BAKER, supra note 12, at 73 n.9.
153. As the leading case on this approach states:
In subrogating the insurer to the injured person’s rights so that the insurer may be
reimbursed for its payment of the insured’s debt to the injured person, the public policy
principle to which we adhere, that the assured may not be relieved of financial
responsibility arising out of his criminal act, is honored. The insurer’s discharge of its
contractual obligations by payment to an innocent injured third person will further the
public interest in compensating the victim.
Ambassador Ins. Co., 388 A.2d at 606–07.
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be subrogated to the victim’s claim against the insured, and the
insurer would try to collect from whatever assets the insured might
have. This is likely preferable to the victim bringing the suit. As
repeat players in litigation, insurance companies are more likely to be
able to proceed inexpensively in a subrogation action and have a
better chance of obtaining blood money from an intentional
tortfeasor. Thus, the insured will more likely feel the deterrent sting
of financial penalties if he has assets to cover all or part of the
judgment.154
(c) The Moral Mistake
Many people express repugnance at the idea of insuring for
intentional torts. The general concern is that the money provided by
insurance is a windfall for a bad actor and bad person.155 These moral
concerns are easily swept aside.
Liability insurance protects not just the well being of the insured,
but also the well being of the victim. It does so by indemnifying the
former and creating remedies for the latter. It is a mistake to focus on
the indemnification of the “bad actor” to the exclusion of the
compensation of the innocent victim. Because there is no real means
to obtain a remedy in the absence of insurance, denying coverage to
the bad actor denies payment to the victim. It is likewise a mistake to
think about liability insurance payments as a benefit to or windfall
for the insured. Liability insurance payments are to the victim, not to
the tortfeasor. The benefit goes to the victim.
One might argue, “This is a windfall to the tortfeasor, because he
does not have to pay out of pocket.” Without insurance, however,
most tortfeasors will never have to defend a lawsuit, let alone pay
blood money. Thus, insurance does not provide a windfall for the
average tortfeasor. Moreover, under the pay and subrogate approach

154. BAKER, supra note 12, at 73 (“Under this . . . approach, the liability insurance contract would
provide coverage for the tort, and the liability insurance company would manage the moral hazard by
subrogation—that is, by going after the insured to recoup the money paid to the victim.”).
155. See generally BAKER, supra note 12 (describing this very common view).
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described above, it is unlikely that insureds will avoid financial
responsibility should they have the ability to pay.
2. Tort’s Expressive Function
Tort law has important expressive functions, including providing
commentary about acceptable social norms and influencing future
behavior.156 Even if the criminal law fills the deterrence gap created
because victims cannot bring civil suits, a failure to compensate
innocent victims may still have significant negative effects. Tort
law’s failure to compensate may serve to enforce a notion that
intentional torts—or, at a minimum, the losses associated with
intentional torts—are an acceptable status quo.157 In other contexts,
such as workplace injuries and automobile accidents, legislatures
have used insurance mechanisms to create compensation schemes
where tort law would otherwise fail victims.158 Yet for victims of
intentional torts, “there is no meaningful, let alone comparable,
compensation system. This disparity sends the message that some
injuries [or the associated losses] are more worthy of compensation
than others.”159 That is, by failing to compensate, society may be
suggesting that intentional torts are unimportant. Further, as
discussed above, noneconomic damages make up a significant
portion of the injury caused by intentional torts. A failure to
compensate these losses may suggest a belief that noneconomic
damages are unimportant, exaggerated, or imagined. A mandatory
liability insurance program would create remedies for
uncompensated torts, justify investment in civil litigation, and send
important messages about the impropriety of intentional bad acts and
the propriety of noneconomic damages.

156. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021,
2025 (1996) (“[T]he law’s ‘statement’ about, for example, the impropriety of monetary exchanges may
be designed to affect social norms and in that way ultimately to affect both judgments and behavior.”).
157. See Wriggins, supra note 12, at 148.
158. See id. at 150–51.
159. Id. at 151.
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3) Political Reality
As the previous parts showed, (a) there are significant benefits to
creating a mandatory liability insurance program, and (b) the
commonly expressed objections to creating liability insurance for
intentional torts are either overstated, correctable through insurance
mechanisms, or both. Yet, such a product is likely to meet significant
opposition. It has been ten years since Wriggins made her far more
modest proposal.160 In that time there has been no movement toward
compulsory liability insurance for domestic torts. This is not
surprising. It is not clear that there is a powerful constituency to
advocate for insurance to cover losses associated with domestic
violence torts, let alone all intentional torts. Even to the extent that
crime victims elicit compassion or have a lobby, the redistributive
nature of this compulsory insurance regime will likely meet fierce
opposition, and moral arguments about indemnifying bad actors will
likely color the debate.
First, legislators and voters are likely to rally against any
compulsory insurance program as an inappropriate intrusion into
private contract decisions. Consider, for instance, the recent reaction
to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), which
requires every resident to purchase health insurance or pay a
penalty.161 PPACA aims to create greater access to care and limit
emergency costs.162 Much like the proposal for intentional tort
liability insurance, PPACA requires everyone to purchase insurance
as a means to control adverse selection by forcing healthier
individuals into the insurance pool. The hope is that the healthiest can

160. See generally id.
161. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010) (as amended by the Healthcare and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat.
1029 (2010)).
162. Proponents of this plan argue that the compulsory nature of PPACA will help limit costs of the
healthcare system by increasing preventative care and reducing emergency room expenditures. See
KENNETH S. ABRAHAM & DANIEL SCHWARCZ, ABRAHAM’S INSURANCE LAW & REGULATION 31 (5th
ed. 2010) (“[T]his mandate helps to limit the number of uninsureds, which itself has larger benefits in
terms of both increasing preventative care and improving emergency room service. But the key purpose
of the individual mandate is to prevent adverse selection.”).
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subsidize the sickest. Indeed, the penalty for failure to purchase
“minimum coverage” is called a “shared responsibility payment.”163
In this way, PPACA is highly redistributive, moving wealth from
the healthy and young to relieve the increasing burden of healthcare
costs from the working poor—those whose incomes are high enough
to exempt them from government healthcare, but who lack steady
employment or employment with benefits.164 This latter group likely
cannot afford to self-insure against catastrophic medical loss and
could not necessarily afford independent coverage before the
mandate.165 Without coverage, this group purportedly fails to use
preventative care and overuses high-cost emergency services. Thus, a
secondary effect of the insurance might be to lower healthcare
expenditures overall.
Of course, PPACA met fierce opposition. The 2010 midterm
elections were notable, to say the least, for anti-incumbent, antiDemocrat political rhetoric. One significant plank in the platform
against incumbent Democratic legislators was the new healthcare
bill. In part, one suspects that it was precisely the redistributive
nature of mandatory health insurance that was at the heart of the
opposition. But other compulsory health insurance programs—like
Medicare and Medicaid—are also redistributive. Current workers
subsidize the healthcare costs of the elderly, sick, and poor. So it may
be that the major opposition is not just to the redistributive portion of
the insurance program, but to the requirement that individuals
actively contract with private insurers.

163. Id. at 29.
164. In 2007, even before the most recent recession, the government estimated that one-seventh of the
population—or close to 45 million persons—were without insurance. Id. at 5. But this number
undersells the problem. According to one study, “80% of the families who turned to bankruptcy after a
medical problem in 1999 had some form of health insurance.” Id. at 10 (citing Melissa B. Jacoby,
Teresa A. Sullivan & Elizabeth Warren, Rethinking the Debates over Health Care Financing: Evidence
from the Bankruptcy Courts, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 377 (2001)). Many who did not resort to
bankruptcy likely saw their life savings depleted and debt soar. Id. (citing Robert W. Seifert & Mark
Rukavina, Bankruptcy Is the Tip of a Medical-Debt Iceberg, 25 HEALTH AFF. 89 (2006)).
165. Healthcare costs have risen from 7.2% of GDP in 1970, to 12.3% in 1990 and 16.2% in 2007.
ABRAHAM & SCHWARCZ, supra note 162, at 6 (citing BOB LYKE, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
HEALTH CARE REFORM: AN INTRODUCTION (Apr. 14, 2009)). The Congressional Budget Office predicts
that without changes in the law, healthcare spending could rise to as much as 25% of GDP in 2025. Id.
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In either event, one could expect the same opposition to a
mandatory insurance program to provide liability insurance for
intentional tortfeasors. People will likely resist participation both as a
reaction against a requirement that they contract and the highly
redistributive nature of the insurance program. Those who believe
that they will neither commit intentional torts nor suffer a criminal
victimization likely will not want to subsidize those who will by
paying significant premiums for insurance they may never need.166
Moreover, unlike Medicare and Social Security, this product will
likely not be viewed as an earned benefit.167
It may be that the redistributive arguments and the contracting
arguments are only the surface concerns. What may be lurking
beneath is a concern about insurance indemnifying bad actors—
people who commit intentionally heinous acts. It may be, in other
words, that the moral repulsion argument is driving some of this
discussion. Even after hearing that bad actors will never face civil
liability for the reasons discussed above, many are still resistant to
the proposal and the thought of helping bad actors with liability
166. To the extent that the intentional tort liability insurance was federally mandated, it could face
constitutional challenges as with PPACA. States and scholars alike have argued that neither the
Commerce Clause, the tax power, nor the Necessary and Proper Clause authorize Congress to require
individuals to purchase insurance from a private company or pay a penalty tax. See, e.g., Randy E.
Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is
Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581 (2010); Randy Barnett, Nathaniel Stewart & Todd
Gaziano, Why the Personal Mandate To Buy Health Insurance Is Unprecedented and Unconstitutional,
HERITAGE FOUND., Dec. 9, 2009, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/12/Whythe-Personal-Mandate-to-Buy-Health-Insurance-Is-Unprecedented-and-Unconstitutional. But see Jack
M. Balkin, The Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate for Health Insurance, 362 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 482 (2010); Brian Galle, Conditional Taxation and the Constitutionality of Health Care Reform,
120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 27, 27 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/images/pdfs/889.pdf; Mark A. Hall, The
Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase Health Insurance, 37 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 38 (2009).
One could expect similar arguments should Congress pass a law requiring individuals to
purchase intentional tort insurance. In fact, these arguments might be stronger in the case of intentional
tort insurance given that the underlying concern of such insurance seems less economic than the
concerns underlying health care insurance. A full discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this
Article, but two points are necessary. First, it is not clear what the outcome of the arguments regarding
the constitutionality of PPACA will be. Second, it would be reasonably easy to work around these
concerns by either having the states mandate the coverage or having the government create a public,
rather than a private, insurance regime. Indeed, there are no such constitutional concerns regarding
Medicare or Social Security.
167. See generally Rick Swedloff, Can’t Settle, Can’t Sue: How Congress Stole Tort Remedies from
Medicare Beneficiaries, 41 AKRON L. REV. 557 (2008).
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insurance.168 These claims may make it difficult, if not impossible, to
move toward a mandatory liability insurance program, especially in
the current political climate.
B) Enhanced Compensation Funds
Given the barriers to creating private liability insurance for
intentional tortfeasors, it may be easier to fix the remedial gap
through more public means. For example, victim compensation funds
could provide more complete remedies directly to the victims of
crime. To do so, victim compensation funds must have the ability to
provide more compensation for more categories of loss. This requires
additional funding from the state and federal governments. In the
end, it is not clear that this approach would garner any more support
than the liability insurance proposal above.
To create complete remedies, legislatures would have to eliminate
existing damage caps and provide awards for noneconomic
damages.169 With these additional features, awards from victim
compensation funds could roughly approximate a damage award a
victim could expect to receive in tort. Although that level of award
would be a remarkable break from current tradition, it would not be
unprecedented. It would mirror the approach to compensation taken
by the U.S. Congress in creating the September 11th Victim
Compensation Fund of 2001 (hereinafter the “9/11 Fund”).170 The
9/11 Fund provided a virtual “blank check,” to a Special Master to
provide compensation for victims of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001.171 The ultimate compensatory awards included
168. Indeed, I am struck by the general aversion to this proposal (this is by no means an empirical
claim), even among colleagues and peers who are especially sympathetic toward the plight of crime
victims.
169. As detailed in Part II.C.2, supra, most victim compensation funds will not provide compensation
for noneconomic losses and provide limited awards for economic loss.
170. Air Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (ATSSSA), Pub. L. No. 107-42, §§ 401–
409, 115 Stat. 230, 237–41 (2001) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2006)).
171. Julie Goldscheid, Crime Victim Compensation in a Post-9/11 World, 79 TUL. L. REV. 167, 197
(2004). Under the authorization statute, the Special Master has an affirmative duty to determine “the
amount of compensation to which the claimant is entitled based on the harm to the claimant, the facts of
the claim, and the individual circumstances of the claimant.” See ATSSSA, § 405(b)(1)(B)(ii). In
considering the “individual circumstances,” the Special Master must determine the “financial needs or
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both individuated economic awards and presumptive awards for
noneconomic injuries. In crafting the individual economic awards,
the Special Master took account of the income of the deceased and
the injury sustained, and then reduced the award by compensation
received from collateral sources.172 The noneconomic awards, on the
other hand, were scheduled to provide some ease of award and
horizontal equity.173 One could imagine a similar approach to crime
victimization.
Enhancing victim compensation funds could have a number of
salutary effects. Crime fighting is a core governmental function, but
there may be little incentive for politicians to invest the resources
necessary to curb crime in the highest crime areas. As Saul Levmore
and Kyle Logue note, while “governments . . . might be dismissed by
the electorate in the event of failed wars [and] unchecked epidemics,
[the same government] might survive perfectly well even though a
minority of the population continues to live in fear of crime and
suffers greatly from it.”174 That is, elected officials may not be
responsive to criminal victimization because the burdens of crime fall
disproportionately on a small group. Victims may not be organized or
politically savvy, the media may not report on victimization in a way
that elicits sympathy, or the population may have become numb to
reports of criminal activity.175 One way to incentivize the government
financial resources of the claimant or the victim’s dependents and beneficiaries.” 28 C.F.R. § 104.41
(2011). As one court noted, the authorization statute provides a virtual “blank check” for compensation.
See Schneider v. Feinberg, 345 F.3d 135, 141–42 (2d Cir. 2003).
172. In granting awards for economic loss, the Special Master had to consider “any pecuniary loss
resulting from harm (including the loss of earnings or other benefits related to employment, medical
expense loss, replacement services loss, loss due to death, burial costs, and loss of business or
employment opportunities) to the extent recovery for such loss is allowed under applicable State law.”
See ATSSSA, § 402(5).
173. In the case of noneconomic loss, rather than allow “case-by-case determination[,] . . . the
regulations provide for a flat rate noneconomic loss award of $250,000 per victim, plus an additional
$100,000 for the spouse and each dependent.” Goldscheid, supra note 171, at 199 n.163; see also 28
C.F.R. § 104.44 (2011).
174. Saul Levmore & Kyle D. Logue, Insuring Against Terrorism—And Crime, 102 MICH. L. REV.
268, 318 (2003).
175. Id. at 319 (“[T]o the extent that a large part of the population need not share the fear that these
victims bear, crime losses may be undervalued by local and state authorities, and are certainly
undervalued by federal government officials.”); see also infra notes 215–223 and accompanying text
(showing that crime disproportionately affects the poor and young).
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to do a better job at fighting crime is to force the government to
internalize the costs created by crime. If the government is made to
pay for “crime, or for losses suffered where there are high crime
rates, [it] might do a superior job at fighting crime, or budgeting the
resources necessary to do so.”176
Despite the laudable crime reduction and compensation goals, such
a plan is unlikely to pass. Compensation funds would ultimately
function as public insurance akin to the private liability insurance
plan described above in Section III.A. To meet the annual price tag of
crime, governments would have to raise additional revenue through
taxation. Current funding sources—fines and penalties levied against
offenders—only meet less than 1% of the estimated annual losses.177
There is likely little political will to raise this additional revenue or
make these additional expenditures.178 Those who will have to foot
the bill for this program are politically powerful and likely to oppose
such a redistributive tax. Criminal victims are marginalized members
of society and unlikely to elicit the compassion necessary to create
these funds.
Second, unlike the fund created after 9/11, there is no galvanizing
event to create a political sympathy. Likewise, there is no need to
protect a vulnerable industry. The 9/11 Fund awards were not simply
symbolic or even restorative in nature. The government feared that
the airlines would be crippled by litigation related to the terrorist
attacks, which would place the entire economy in further peril.179
Thus, the awards had to be attractive enough that victims would
forgo tort lawsuits. These same concerns are simply not present in the
case of crime victims. There are essentially no lawsuits against

176. Levmore & Logue, supra note 174, at 318.
177. See supra note 125.
178. As Levmore and Logue explain, “the current absence of a strong federal crime-insurance . . .
program is likely attributable to failures of the political process—in the sense that the parties most likely
to benefit from such a regime are least likely to overcome collective-action problems to lobby for its
enactment.” Levmore & Logue, supra note 174, at 313.
179. See generally Schneider v. Feinberg, 345 F.3d 135, 139 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that the 9/11
Fund remedies were designed to replace tort remedies and “‘preserve the continued viability of the
United States air transportation system’ from potentially ruinous tort liability in the wake of the
attacks”).
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tortfeasors and victims cannot successfully sue the government for
more or better policing.
Third, it may be that the early successes of the victims’ rights
movement reached their zenith. There is seemingly little political
desire to create additional remedies. In part, this may be because the
victims themselves are marginalized. It may also be that the
additional losses to be covered are disfavored. People may not
support more complete remedies for noneconomic damages, because
they think the losses are imagined, exaggerated, or incommensurable.
As such, some may think there is no reason to provide additional
financial remedies.
Thus, this proposal is also unlikely to gain significant attention
from legislatures.180
C) A Market for First Party Insurance
There is another way to create remedies for victims: allow people
to self-insure to a greater extent against the losses created by
intentional torts. Insurers already cover some of the losses. For
example, most life insurance policies will pay beneficiaries the death
benefit regardless of “whether the insured dies of natural causes or is
murdered.”181 Likewise, most property insurance will cover crimerelated losses, including theft and damage to property.182 But this
self-insurance regime suffers in at least two respects. First, existing
coverage will not cover noneconomic losses. The conventional
wisdom posits that insurers will not sell and purchasers will not buy
insurance for noneconomic injuries. This part challenges these
assumptions and explores what it would take to create supply and
180. Legislatures and insurers may further fear two moral hazard problems associated with this
proposal. First is the concern that individuals would not avoid criminal victimization if provided full
compensation. This concern is discussed supra note 143. There is another moral hazard concern that
might be more troublesome—if the compensation funds reduce payments based on collateral income (as
from property insurance or healthcare insurance), potential victims may choose to purchase less
insurance than is otherwise reasonable. This concern could be dealt with through regulation and
individuation of awards. Administrators could determine what a presumptive, reasonable amount of
first-party insurance is, and put the burden on the victim to explain why he or she has less coverage.
181. Levmore & Logue, supra note 174, at 315.
182. See id. (“Standard property policies tend to cover crime-related property losses, which means
that such policies do not generally contain crime exclusions, although there are exceptions.”).
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demand (and thus a workable market) for first party insurance for
noneconomic loss. Second, there is already significant
underinvestment in first-party insurance. Given the added expense of
insurance for noneconomic damages, it is not likely that those most
in need would purchase adequate coverage. Thus, this part concludes
by considering the case for the government subsidizing private
insurance for noneconomic losses.
1) Supplying Insurance for Noneconomic Injuries
Insurers allegedly won’t sell insurance for noneconomic damages
out of concerns about ex post moral hazard and adverse selection.183
The fear with respect to ex post moral hazard is that insureds will
claim the maximum loss regardless of the actual injury suffered.
Given the intensely personal nature of noneconomic loss, insurers
may claim that there is no real way to verify the amount of loss.184
This problem, however, is not insurmountable; there may be simple
ways around the moral hazard barrier. For instance, insurance
companies could set a schedule of payments for different types of
loss, such that any triggering event would qualify for a set amount of
noneconomic compensation, much like the schedule attached to the
payments from the 9/11 Fund.185 This would avoid the problem of ex
post moral hazard because insurers would simply assume a maximum
loss for each triggering event. Alternatively, insurers could treat these
claims the way they treat uninsured or underinsured claims: by
making the insurer an adverse party to the insured. This proposal may
raise a significant specter of bad faith—pitting the insurer against the
insured in every claim. Together with a modified schedule of

183. See generally supra Part II.B.
184. These fears are largely abated in the third-party insurance market because insurance companies
can establish rates based on the probability of accidents and the probability of damage awards. Insurers
can determine the actual value of the noneconomic loss through an adversarial system. Whether through
litigation or bargaining, the insurer can take a stand if it believes that the claim for noneconomic
damages is too high. In the first-party context, the same adversarial stand may expose insurers to bad
faith liability.
185. See supra note 173.
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damages, however, it might serve to reduce some concerns about ex
post moral hazard.186
The fear with respect to adverse selection is that insurers cannot
distinguish between risks, and will thus have to charge rates that are
fair across the entire population. As a result, insurers may fear that
only bad risks—those who suffer more and suffer more often—will
be attracted to the insurance. But it is unclear how significant the
adverse selection problem is. Insureds may not have sufficient private
information to predict better than insurers whether and how much
they will suffer. To the contrary, insurers are quite adept at utilizing
public information to classify risks.187
In fact, this might be a situation where the best risks (the least
likely to suffer or to suffer the least) are most likely to purchase
insurance. This advantageous or propitious selection occurs because
those who are risk-averse in their behavior are also likely risk-averse
with respect to their financial decisions.188 Risk-averse individuals
are likely to both take precaution against accidents and purchase
insurance to hedge against the potential loss. Those who are riskseeking will neither take precaution nor hedge against the loss.189
Here, it is possible that those who are most fearful of suffering a
noneconomic loss may, in fact, be the ones who most assiduously
avoid it, even after purchasing the insurance.

186. Insurers may still fear an ex ante moral hazard problem—that insureds will not take enough
precaution to avoid the risk of harm. Given the severity of the harm, it seems unlikely that insureds will
fail to avoid intentionally tortious acts that cause noneconomic damages. Further, insurers may be able
to control this problem by threatening to raise premiums when insureds suffer losses.
187. See Siegelman, supra note 80, at 1243–45; see also supra note 140.
188. David DeMeza & David C. Webb, Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets, 32 RAND J.
ECON. 249, 250 (2001); David Hemenway, Propitious Selection, 105 Q.J. ECON. 1063, 1064 (1990).
“Propitious selection, as its name suggests, implies that insurance is most attractive to the lowest-risk
individuals among those eligible to buy it, not to those with the highest risks.” Siegelman, supra note
80, at 1266.
189. Siegelman details the empirical evidence for propitious selection, including the fact that those
who purchase life insurance have a lower death rate than those who do not; fewer credit cards with
insurance are stolen than those without; and the fact that those who purchase collision insurance for
rental cars are more likely to wear seatbelts. See Siegelman, supra note 80, at 1270–71 (citing DeMeza
& Webb, supra note 188; Hemenway, supra note 188). I do not claim that this is proof of either
propitious selection generally or with respect to noneconomic damages specifically. I mean only to
suggest that there are significant reasons to doubt the impact of adverse selection.
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Thus, there may be ways around, or reasons to doubt, the
commonly held concerns about supplying insurance for noneconomic
damages.
2) Creating Demand for Noneconomic Loss Insurance
Even if insurers agreed to indemnify individuals for noneconomic
losses, there might not be a workable market. To create a market,
there must be both supply and demand. Conventional wisdom is that
individuals do not want insurance for losses.190 There are, however,
some reasons to doubt this conventional wisdom, or, at a minimum,
believe that there may be ways around the lack of demand.
Consumers demand insurance because they prefer a certain income
to an uncertain income with the same expected return.191 That is,
people would likely prefer to have a 100% chance to make $50,000
to a 50% chance of making either $100,000 or $0. Most people make
this choice because they are risk-averse.192 They suffer more from a
loss of $50,000 than they enjoy a gain of $50,000.193 Even if an
individual has a steady job and certain wages, income could still be
uncertain. For example, investments are uncertain, life activities like
driving or home-ownership could create liability, which itself
introduces income uncertainty for income or wealth, and malicious or
190. See, e.g., Robert Cooter, Towards a Market in Unmatured Tort Crimes, 75 VA. L. REV. 383, 392
(1989) (arguing that “a rational person would insure only against that pain and suffering that curtailed
earnings”); George L. Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modern Tort Law, 96 YALE L.J. 1521,
1546–47 (1987) (stating that “individuals . . . do not voluntarily insure for non-pecuniary losses”).
191. See generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 50 (5th ed. 2008) (“A
person is said to be risk-averse if she considers the utility of a certain prospect of money income to be
higher than the expected utility of an uncertain prospect of equal expected monetary value.”).
192. Risk aversion, in turn, can be explained by the diminishing marginal return of money.
Diminishing marginal utility simply means that “the more money you have, the less additional
happiness you would get from another dollar.” RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11
(7th ed. 2007). Said differently, it is generally true (although not true for some) that $10,000 will bring
more happiness to someone making $50,000 than it will to someone making $500,000. Because most
people experience less utility from each additional dollar gained, most people are risk-averse.
193. Steven Croley & Jon Hanson, The Nonpecuniary Costs of Accidents: Pain and Suffering
Damages in Tort Law, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1785, 1795 (1995) (“Because an individual gets less
satisfaction from the next unit of a given economic resource than from the last, the individual would
forego acquiring that next unit of the resource to avoid the risk of sacrificing the last.”). There are, of
course, people who are risk-neutral or risk-seeking. Gambling, skydiving, and rock climbing are all
examples of risk seeking behavior.
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negligent acts of others could create losses or otherwise change
income.
Insurance provides a mechanism to control these uncertainties. In
purchasing an insurance policy, the individual “give[s] up a certain
amount of income (the insurance premium)” and in exchange, the
insurer bears the risk of the uncertain event.194 “The risk-averse
person considers himself better off with the lower certain income
than facing the uncertain higher income.”195 In choosing how much
insurance to purchase, the conventional model predicts that
individuals will equalize “marginal utilities over time and over
possible states of the world.”196 The insurance consumer does this by
transferring dollars out of the pre-accident world until “the marginal
utility of the last dollar transferred in the pre-accident world equals
the marginal utility of that dollar in the post-accident world.”197
Scholars have claimed that people will choose not to transfer
money out of a pre-accident world to insure against a noneconomic
interest in the post-accident world.198 According to this theory,
people won’t spend money on insurance premiums to provide
financial remedies for pain, suffering, or loss of enjoyment of life,
which are inherently nonmonetary injuries. But it is not clear to what
extent this is true. For example, there is some evidence that
individuals will purchase the same amount of insurance for economic
losses as for noneconomic losses.199 Ronen Avraham ran a series of
experiments in which participants were asked to make insurance
194. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 191, at 52.
195. Id.
196. Croley & Hanson, supra note 193, at 1795.
197. Id. See also KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, DISTRIBUTING RISK: INSURANCE, LEGAL THEORY, AND
PUBLIC POLICY 24 (1986) (“People pay a few of their last earned dollars to avoid the risk of losing their
first-earned dollars.”).
198. Some scholars have argued that the lack of an insurance market for noneconomic damages is
evidence that tort victims would not choose to have damages for pain and suffering ex ante. See, e.g.,
Cooter, supra note 190, at 392; Priest, supra note 190, at 1546–47. They then use this to justify caps on
those damages. To the extent there is empirical evidence for the premise of this argument, the
conclusion depends on a rational decision not to purchase insurance for noneconomic damages. As the
remainder of this section argues, the barriers to purchase may be related ultimately to the decision not to
sell insurance, and to behavioral biases and heuristics that prevent the cold, rational analysis required by
the crowd arguing against noneconomic damages based on insurance demand.
199. See Ronen Avraham, Should Pain-And-Suffering Damages Be Abolished From Tort Law? More
Experimental Evidence, 55 U. TORONTO L.J. 941 (2005).
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decisions about different products (padding for roller skates, a
portable saw, a facial cream, a computer monitor, a trampoline, and
tires for a new car). Each product was associated with a different
kind of physical injury including migraine headaches and brain
injuries. The participants were asked to state how much they would
pay, over the price of each product, for insurance to cover both the
economic and noneconomic losses related to the injuries. Avraham
found that the 89% of the participants “treated both types of
insurance the same—either they bought them both or they bought
neither. Moreover, on average . . . the majority of participants treated
both types of insurance exactly the same—that is, they paid exactly
the same amount of money for both types of insurance.”200
Despite the fact that Avraham found some modest evidence of a
demand for insurance for noneconomic injuries, that demand has not
produced a functioning market. This may be because there is, in fact,
no supply. Without a supply, there is often no demand, especially in
the insurance context. Individuals are more likely to buy insurance if
they know others who have purchased a similar policy. Market
penetration of an insurance product often determines whether any
given individual will purchase the product.201 This could be true for a
number of reasons. It may be a result of social norms—if many
people in a community have a certain kind of insurance, others will
want to have it as well. It may be that potential purchasers fear
“embarrassment that one does not have protection when one learns
that others do.”202 Or it may be that individuals “think (correctly or
incorrectly) that their friends have similar preferences to them and
have already gone to the trouble of gathering information—so it
makes sense to copy them. In this sense friends and neighbors reduce
the search costs of obtaining information on the risk and the policy
terms.”203 In any case, where as here, there is no functioning market,
latent demand likely will not rise to the surface.

200.
201.
202.
203.

Published by Reading Room, 2012

Id. at 944.
See Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 78, at 96.
Id.
Id.

59

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 28, Iss. 3 [2012], Art. 12

780

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:3

Moreover, while Avraham’s study suggests that there is some
demand for insurance for noneconomic losses, it does not help
evaluate whether, and under what circumstances, people would
demand the insurance outside of a controlled laboratory environment.
There are reasons to believe that potential purchasers will
underestimate the likelihood of injury and fail to price noneconomic
injuries properly or otherwise consider the injuries incommensurable.
These biases may hamper development of demand for insurance for
noneconomic injuries.
First, in other insurance contexts, individuals tend not to purchase
insurance for high-risk, low-probability events.204 Individuals tend
not to buy insurance against earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, or major
medical events even when the government subsidizes the insurance
such that the premiums are less than the expected loss.205 In both
experimental settings and surveys, insurance purchasers act as if low
probability results are unlikely to occur at all. The purchaser assumes
that with respect to low probability events “nothing seriously bad will
happen to me.”206 It may be that potential consumers consider events
that cause noneconomic loss so improbable as to assume they will
never suffer this kind of loss.
It may be that people consider low probability events to be no
probability events because “people prefer not to think about negative
events or ones that they fear.”207 Significant noneconomic loss like
loss of enjoyment of life associated with paralysis certainly falls in
this category. That is, insurance purchasers (like all humans) have
limited memories and limited computational skills, and therefore
must use mental shortcuts to assist in some decision-making.208 The
204. See id. at 92 (“When it comes to protecting oneself against events that may have a major
financial impact, but a low probability of occurrence, individuals often do not take out insurance.”).
205. See id.
206. Id. at 79. See also Howard Latin, “Good” Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations,
41 UCLA L. Rev. 1193, 1245 n.230 (1994) (“When asked about their insurance decisions, subjects in
both the laboratory and survey studies indicated a disinclination to worry about low-probability
hazards.” (quoting Howard Kunreuther & Paul Slovic, Economics, Psychology, and Protective
Behavior, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 64, 67 (1978))).
207. Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 78, at 92.
208. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman, Paul
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types of events associated with insurance decisions are prime
candidates for heuristics, because they are unpleasant to think
about.209 Thus, insurance purchasers may presume that low
probability events are actually no probability events simply to avoid
thinking about the horrible consequences.
Second, even to the extent that consumers correctly predict the
probability of an accident, insurance purchasers may not be able to
properly price the magnitude of a noneconomic loss. In part, this may
be related to the fact that most individuals have little experience with
the kinds of loss that would cause significant pain, suffering,
emotional distress, or loss of enjoyment of life. Thus, as with
predictions about the probability of the loss, insurance purchasers’
predictions about the amount of noneconomic loss are likely to be
inaccurate.210 But the problem of lack of experience is exacerbated
precisely because consumers are being asked to predict future
emotional states.
Research has shown that people typically overestimate how long
and much their future emotional states will change in response to life
events—like winning the lottery or sustaining an injury.211 This
overestimation could lead potential insurance purchasers to conclude
Slovic & Amos Tversky eds., 1982). See also Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1477 (1998).
209. Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 78, at 79, 92.
210. They likewise can’t predict the amount of economic losses either. As Ellen Pryor observed,
insurance consumers likely can’t guess the amount it would cost to obtain physical, emotional, or
vocational rehabilitation; retrofits to a home or car; adapted transportation; or any of the other myriad
economic means to cope with and adapt to a disability. See Ellen S. Pryor, The Tort Law Debate,
Efficiency, and the Kingdom of Ill: A Critique of the Insurance Theory of Compensation, 79 VA. L. REV.
91, 111 (1993).
211. For overviews of affective forecasting, see Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Law and the Emotions: The
Problems of Affective Forecasting, 80 IND. L.J. 155, 165–81 (2005); George Loewenstein & David
Schkade, Wouldn’t It Be Nice? Predicting Future Feelings, in WELL-BEING: THE FOUNDATIONS OF
HEDONIC PSYCHOLOGY 85 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1999); Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T.
Gilbert, Affective Forecasting, 35 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 345 (2003). There are a
number of reasons for this overestimation. For example, when asked to predict how an event will impact
their happiness, individuals focus on the event to the exclusion of the rest of their life circumstances that
may mitigate the impact of the event. Further, individuals may not have familiarity with the event
prompting the emotional experience and thus may not be able to predict with any precision how it would
really impact their lives. Even if some individuals have some experience with the event, most cannot
properly draw on past emotional experiences as a guide because they systematically misremember
emotional experiences. This ultimately distorts their ability to predict future emotional experiences. See
Blumenthal, supra at 174.
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that no amount of money could compensate or alleviate their pain
and suffering after incurring a serious disability. That is, ex ante, the
consumer may believe that serious disabilities are incommensurable,
and money will not help ex post. If this is true, purchasers may
further believe that there is no reason to spend money on insurance
for pain and suffering, because an insurance payment will not
maximize the marginal utility of money. Consider it this way: if you
believe that no amount of money in the future is going to abate your
pain and suffering after an accident, why would you take dollars
away from your present self and invest them for your future disabled
self?
A functioning market might change some of these decisions. If
insurers sold the product, it is possible that there would be sufficient
market penetration and uptake throughout communities. But it is hard
to know exactly because insurers don’t sell insurance for
noneconomic loss. Avraham’s study does not eliminate the concern
that people will not purchase insurance for noneconomic injuries
because they underpredict the likelihood of suffering a noneconomic
loss and overpredict the impact of such a loss.212 Participants in the
studies were given information about both the probability of an
accident occurring and the magnitude of the expected damages.213
Moreover, by pricing the injuries, the studies may have made it seem
like there was in fact a substantial market for insurance for
noneconomic damages and that noneconomic injuries are
commensurable with money. In other words, the study stripped away
a number of the barriers that may inhibit demand for this type of
insurance from flourishing. While this makes for good experimental
design, more data is necessary before we could determine whether
demand would flourish outside of an experimental setting.

212. See Avraham, supra note 199.
213. See id. at 958, 965 (“Participants were informed the probability of an accident occurring and of
the magnitude of the expected damages so that they had enough information to calculate the expected
loss . . . .”).
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3) Benefits and the Need for Subsidization
Insurance covers some losses related to crime (the noneconomic
losses) and there is a potential to create a market for the uncovered
noneconomic losses. Creating this additional coverage comes at a
price; it likely requires government intervention. First, as described
above, individuals often fail to buy actuarially fair insurance for
economic losses that are high loss, low probability events. This alone
suggests a need to subsidize the insurance. Second, most people are
underinsured for even their economic losses, and will not recoup
significant property or healthcare losses.214 As described above,
given the nature of the injury, the barriers to first party insurance may
be exacerbated in the context of noneconomic losses. It may be
further exacerbated in the context of intentional tort, where the
victims are disproportionately poor and young.
For example, the poor are far more likely to be victims of crime
than are the wealthy. Someone living in a household earning under
$7,500 a year is far more likely to be victimized than someone living
in a household earning over $75,000 a year.215 Across all income
levels there are over 21 victimizations per 1,000 persons over the age
of 12 each year.216 The incidence more than doubles when looking at
only those living in households that earn under $7,500 a year.217 In
those households, there are over 50 victimizations per every 1,000
persons over the age of 12.218 In contrast, there are fewer than 15
victimizations per 1,000 of those living in households earning more
than $75,000.219 Figure 4 displays these statistics:

214. Most people “tend to purchase inadequate coverage for a variety of contingencies.” Levmore &
Logue, supra note 174, at 316. Levmore and Logue hypothesize that this underinvestment may be a
result of a “disinclination to dwell on unpleasant eventualities.” Id.; see also supra notes 73–75.
215. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES,
2007
STATISTICAL
TABLES
tbl.14
(2010),
available
at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus07.pdf. This data is taken from the National Crime
Victimization Survey (NCVS).
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
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Figure 4: Incidence of Victimization Per 1,000 Persons
Age 12 and Older by Household Income
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Likewise, victimization is distributed toward the young. The
incidence of victimization for someone aged 16-19 is twice as high as
someone aged 25-34.220 In 2007, there were over 50 victimizations
for every 1,000 persons aged 16-19.221 For people only ten years
older, the numbers look significantly better. Out of every 1,000
persons aged 25-34, there were approximately 25 personal and
violent victimizations.222 The likelihood of victimization continues to
fall as individuals get older. Figure 5 displays these disparities.223

220. Id. at tbl.9.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION IN THE UNITED
STATES,
2007
STATISTICAL
TABLES
tbls.2
&
3
(2010),
available
at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/cvus07.pdf. This data is taken from the National Crime
Victimization Survey (NCVS).
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Incidence of Victimization Per 1,000 Persons Age 12
and Over By Age
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In short, the young and the poor are the most victimized segments
of our society. Neither group can (or is likely to) save for the
proverbial rainy day. As Levmore and Logue note,
Inner-city property owners, including businesses and
homeowners, self-insure far more than their counterparts in
affluent areas, in part because of availability problems . . . . As
far as life insurance is concerned, it simply is not possible for
low-income earners to purchase significant insurance coverage,
even though the value of their lives to their families can be
224
substantial in economic terms.

Purchasing insurance to cover economic losses—let alone
insurance to cover noneconomic losses—may be more of a luxury
than the poor can afford or the young believe they need. And given
the problem in the context of economic losses, it would be surprising
if a working market for insurance for noneconomic losses would
garner significant demand among many who need it most. Therefore
224. Levmore & Logue, supra note 174, at 317.
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losses, including work disruptions and noneconomic losses, are likely
to have a greater impact.
One way to alleviate some of these problems would be to have the
government subsidize some portion of the premiums for crime
insurance. Some of the same reasons that justify enhanced victim
compensation funds could justify government subsidies in this arena.
First, it would create more compensation for victims of crime.
Second, it would force the government to internalize some portion of
the costs of crime victimization. Unlike compensation funds, this
approach would create an additional lobbying group to advocate for
crime prevention—the insurance industry. Insurers would have an
incentive to reduce the number of victims of crime. “[J]ust as auto
insurers compose a powerful political force in this country for
increased auto-safety standards, so too” insurers providing coverage
to victims of crime “would have an interest in encouraging
lawmakers to adopt effective crime-reducing measures.”225
This approach, however, suffers like the others. There is likely no
political lobby to create such a subsidy. Moreover, insurers have
shown little interest over the years in creating such a market. Thus, as
with the two proposals above, there are significant barriers to this
approach.
CONCLUSION
Each year victims of intentional torts suffer significant losses.
Those losses, however, are not compensable through the civil system.
Victims simply cannot recover from judgment-proof defendants.
And, liability insurance, the fuel that makes the litigation engine go,
won’t cover intentional acts. Without coverage, the tort system fails.
This sad fact undermines both the deterrence and compensation
functions of tort law. While the criminal system picks up some of the
deterrence slack, victims are often left without remedy. And no other
part of the compensation system steps in to fill this void.

225. Levmore & Logue, supra note 174, at 319.
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I have proposed three ways to close this remedial gap and create
financial compensation for those injured through intentional torts.
Each proposal requires significant government intervention and each
would have significant redistributive effects. Thus, especially in an
era of tight budgets, each proposal is likely to meet stiff opposition.
There may be, however, very good reasons to support these
redistributive efforts (beyond the compensation created). Creating
remedies may express and confirm our shared societal values about
the abhorrence of intentional torts and the importance of
noneconomic damages. Forcing the government to invest in
compensation may encourage it to devote additional resources to
crime prevention. Further, to the extent that the private insurers are
part of the solution, those insurers may become powerful lobbyists on
behalf of crime reduction.
Admittedly, this Article offers a sobering and perhaps pessimistic
view of the possibility of enacting these proposals, but there are
significant reasons to support a regime that compensates for the
harms that fall to victims of intentional torts.
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